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I. INTRODUCTION
Recurring news reports1 about state and local governments facing unfunded 
public sector pension obligations raise concerns among policy makers,2 
scholars,3 and the general public.  The enormous pension deficits the public
sector currently faces did not suddenly appear one day.  Years and years of
over-generous pension arrangements given to public servants,4 accompanied 
by mismanagement and unsatisfactory funding, created today’s mega-
billion pension deficits.5 
1. See, e.g., Ed Bachrach, Opinion, Commentary: A Federal Solution to Chicago’s 
Public Pension Mess, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 7, 2016, 7:01 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/opinion/commentary/ct-public-pensions-unfunded-police-chicago-perspec-0909­
jm-20160907-story.html (reporting that Chicago’s five major pension plans suffer from a
$35 billion deficit of unfunded pensions); Aaron Kuriloff & Timothy W. Martin, Connecticut, 
America’s Richest State, Has a Huge Pension Problem, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2015, 12:36
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/connecticut-americas-richest-state-has-a-huge-pension­
problem-1443996813 (reporting on the current pension funding challenges that Connecticut
faces); Mary Williams Walsh, Dallas Stares Down a Texas-Size Threat of Bankruptcy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/business/dealbook/
dallas-pension-debt-threat-of-bankruptcy.html?_r=0 (reporting that Dallas Police and Fire
Pension System asked the city for a one-time infusion of $1.1 billion, an amount roughly
equal to Dallas’s entire general fund budget). 
2. See, e.g., Public Employee Pension Transparency Act, H.R. 4822, 114th Cong. 
§ 149A (2016) (amending the Internal Revenue Code to deny tax benefits relating to bonds 
issued by a state or political subdivision during any period in which such state or political
subdivision is noncompliant with specified reporting requirements for state or local 
government employee pension benefit plans). 
3. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 3, 3 (2013) (examining the “political environment within which public pension promises
are made and funded,” and whether “states could implement meaningful reforms without 
violating either state or federal law”); James Naughton & Holger Spamann, Fixing Public 
Sector Finances: The Accounting and Reporting Lever, 62 UCLA L. REV. 572, 572 (2015)
(arguing “that partial responsibility for [the finances of many states and cities] lies with the 
outdated and ineffective financial reporting regime for public entities”); Adam Riff, The 
Eminent Domain Path out of a Public Pension Crisis, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 307, 310 (2015)
(considering whether and how a government could clear a path to reform by proactively
asserting its power against the pensions promised to its current employees in exchange for
just compensation).
4. See Beermann, supra note 3, at 16–26 (examining whether excessive promises of
retirement benefits have been made to public employees and whether public pension plans
are subject to abuse).
5. Estimated to be between $3.412 billion and $1.191 billion.  See infra text accompanying 
note 243. 
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Why were these deficits not noticed before becoming a national problem?
Recent voices criticize the distinctly non-business accounting methods used
by public sector entities.6  Primitive practices, so it is argued, implemented 
by the public sector, allowed billions of dollars in pension deficits to
develop without being noticed by gatekeepers, the media, or the general
public.7 
Instead of focusing on specific perplexing or questionable accounting 
methods used by state and local governments,8 this article directs attention 
to the institutional arrangements that created an inadequate disclosure 
regime for the public sector and hence prepared the ground for these deficits
to develop.  Responding to those seeking remedy through further expansion
of practices already shared by the public sector and business sector accounting 
systems,9 in other words, making the two systems more similar,10 this
article highlights necessary normative differences in the disclosure objectives
of the two sectors.  It also challenges the public sector’s existing institutional 
arrangements for accounting standard setting, that is, the delegation11 of
 6. See G. Eddy Birrer, GASB Statement 68 on Pensions: A Solution to the Public 
Pension Crisis?, J. GOV’T FIN. MGMT., Fall 2014, at 34, 35 (arguing that GASB Statement 
68 provides greater transparency, enabling legislators and others to make more informed
pension-related decisions and to better understand the status of a governmental entity’s 
financial condition); Naughton & Spamann, supra note 3, at 574. 
7. The current discussion regarding public entities’ accounting practices echo
some ideas previously expressed in a discussion regarding the Social Security System. 
Compare Peter A. Diamond & Peter R. Orszag, Accrual Accounting for Social Security, 
41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 173 (2004) (objecting to Professor Jackson’s proposal as
granting too large a role for accrual based accounting in the federal budget), with Howell
E. Jackson, Accounting for Social Security and Its Reform, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59, 59
(2004) (raising objections to the current system of accounting for Social Security), and 
Kent Smetters, The Inadequacies of Accrual Accounting for Social Security, 41 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 215, 215 (2004) (agreeing with Jackson’s call for increased transparency
regarding future obligations but nevertheless, arguing that accrual accounting fails to
adequately reflect the current state of the Social Security System).
8. See, e.g., Naughton & Spamann, supra note 3, at 581 (acknowledging the lack
of reconciliation of accrual numbers with actual cash payments).
9. E.g., id. at 572. 
10. Among other things, by introducing SEC oversight over public entities’ disclosures.
See id. at 593. 
11. As long as “Congress . . . ‘lay[s] down . . . an intelligible principle to which the 
person or body authorized to act is directed to conform,’” then delegation of powers is
seen as a legitimate transfer of semi-legislative powers from the legislator to a non-
legislative agency, such as an administrative agency. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & GRIER
STEPHENSON, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS AND SELECTED
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standard-setting authority for disclosure requirements to private organizations 
(privatization)—an arrangement originally adopted from the business sector.12 
Accordingly, this Article draws special attention to the institutional approach
shared by the business and public sectors,13 to theoretical difficulties this
institutional approach creates within the context of the public sector, and 
to the dramatic consequences “on-the-ground” that this approach has already
had on pension disclosures.  This Article argues that the undetected inflation 
of current pension deficits resulted directly from inadequate disclosure 
standards for public entities, promulgated by the public sector’s private 
standard-setter—the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, the “GASB.” 
On the conceptual level, this article further argues that delegation of the 
power to prescribe accounting practices transfers sovereign powers extending 
far beyond the mere regulation of financial reporting.  Although such
delegation can be justified14 with respect to the business sector,15 when it 
CASES 82 (Routledge 16th ed. 2015) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). 
12. See infra notes 36–48 and accompanying text. 
13. Under existing case law, promulgation of accounting and disclosure standards—
recognized as generally accepted accounting principles for the purpose of the securities 
acts—are not considered as rules and therefore, do not constitute a delegation of the SEC’s
rule-making power.  See Arthur Andersen & Co. v. SEC, No. 76C-2832, 1978 WL 1073, 
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 1978) (characterizing the SEC recognition of some accounting 
standards promulgated by the AICPA as an evaluation method only, and not a substantive 
rule).
14. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[I]n our increasingly complex
society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot 
do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”); see also
Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of Administrative
Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 121 (2011) (arguing that the court should focus upon due 
process as the primary constitutional constraint on congressional delegation); George W.
Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 
650, 654–55 (1975) (arguing “that a per se doctrine precluding delegation of legislative 
powers to private persons is not needed and would have unfortunate results,” and for “practical
nonexistence of a per se rule against such delegations”). 
15. See ROBERT VAN RIPER, SETTING STANDARDS FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING: FASB
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF A CRITICAL PROCESS 9 (1994) (emphasizing the 
private sector’s experience); William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: 
A New Look at the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5, 5 (2007); 
Douglas W. Hawes, Whither Accounting and the Law? A Comparative Analysis of the
Sources of Accounting Authority in the Light of International Developments, 2 J. COMP.
CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 195, 210 (1979) (arguing that governments operate too slowly in 
response to changes needed in accounting); Maurice C. Kaplan & Daniel M. Reaugh, 
Accounting, Reports to Stockholders, and the SEC, 48 YALE L.J. 935, 954 & n.78 (1939) 
(arguing that delegation is a device that preserves flexibility); Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Global 
Private Governance: Lessons from a National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 225, 230–32 (emphasizing the private 
sector’s highest levels of technical expertise).  But see George Mundstock, The Trouble
568
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comes to the public sector, delegation of accounting powers from the 
accountable and legitimate regulator to an unaccountable and self-agenda 
driven private organization leads to substantive difficulties, both in theory
and in practice. Among other things, with respect to public entities, privatization
has resulted in financial reporting that serves needs different than,16 and 
partly contradictory to, the desire for efficient, effective, and accountable 
governance of public entities.17 
According to this Article, the remedy for the public sector financial system 
is not found in increasing business properties in public sector disclosures,18 
but rather in further distinguishing public sector disclosures from those
used in the business sector,19 bringing state and local government disclosures
more in line with those of the federal sector. 
On the practical level, this Article proposes providing state and local
governments with incentives to replace the current use of GASB-promulgated 
disclosure standards with more publicly oriented disclosure standards, 
such as those promulgated by the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory
Board—“The Federal Advisory Board.”  The Federal Advisory Board is a
federal disclosure standard setter that has successfully served the federal 
government during the same time the GASB provided state and local 
governments with inadequate disclosure requirements for pension liabilities 
that in part contribute to the creation of today’s pension crisis. 
To some extent, this article provides support for the “Public Employee 
Pension Transparency Act” (Transparency Bill).20  The Transparency Bill, 
introduced in all 111th to 114th Congress—however not yet became 
with FASB, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 813, 816–24 (2003) (arguing against some of 
these justifications). 
16. See Israel Klein, The Gap in the Perception of the GAAP, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 581,
612 (2017) (arguing that “through the process of gathering a firm’s information and expressing
it in accounting terms,” financial reporting serves some interests and not others). 
17. See James Naughton et al., Public Pension Accounting Rules and Economic
Outcomes, 59 J. ACCT. & ECON. 221, 223 (2015) (suggesting that the GASB approach “is 
associated with policy choices . . . that have the potential to exacerbate . . . fiscal stress”).
18. For example, introducing Securities and Exchange Commission oversights.  Naughton 
& Spamann, supra note 3, at 579 (citing U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE 
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, at iv (2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/
munireport073112.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NQ2-3F8E]). 
19. See also Klein, supra note 16, at 615 (discussing the difference between an investor’s 
perspective and other perspectives used in financial accounting). 
20. Public Employee Pension Transparency Act, H.R. 4822, 114th Cong. (2016); 
H.R. 1628 (S. 779) 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 567 (S. 347), 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 6484, 
111th Cong. (2010). 
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law—proposes making tax benefits related to bonds issued by a state or
political subdivision conditional upon compliance with specific reporting 
requirements, regarding post-employment financial liabilities, established
by Congress.21  However, and more importantly, the Article points to the
fact that the Transparency Bill only deals with a symptom of a much deeper
problem—the ability of public sector entities to “shop” their disclosures 
and therefore to avoid accountability and scrutiny.
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part II, I review the institutional 
arrangements currently governing disclosures both for the business sector
and the public sector; the normative framework that established the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, the “FASB,” as the prominent accounting 
promulgator for the business sector; and the historical circumstances that
led to the creation of the GASB as an alternative and almost equal 
authoritative standard setter for the public sector.  In Part III, I discuss the 
existing justification supporting privatization of disclosure standard setting. 
I explain why these justifications, originally developed in the context of 
the business sector and the delegation of accounting standard setting 
powers from the SEC to the FASB, do not hold up in the case of the public 
sector. In Part IV, I discuss the implications for sovereignty of privatizing 
accounting standard setting for public entities. I explain how setting 
disclosure standards affects the ability of the public to control the public
entity, its accountability, and the incentives given to the entity’s executives to
serve the public good.  In Parts V and VI, after the full meaning of delegating 
accounting standard-setting powers and the lack of justification thereof 
are brought to light, I turn to discussing how the GASB, the current prominent 
private accounting standard-setter for the public sector, has exercised its
delegated powers. I expose how the GASB acted differently than other 
accounting standard-setters such as the Federal Advisory Board—a difference
that contributed to the development of the current pension crisis.  In Part 
VII, the last section of the Article, I draw directly from the lessons learned 
from the development of the pension crisis and the lack of justifications 
for accounting privatization in the public sector and propose reducing the 
extent of privatization involved in setting accounting standards for the 
public sector. My proposal focuses on providing state and local governments
with incentives for replacing voluntary use of GASB standards with
compulsory use of those of the Federal Advisory Board. 
21. See H.R. 4822 §§ 149A, 4980J; infra Section VII.3. 
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II. THE PRIVATIZATION OF DISCLOSURE STANDARD-SETTING
Except as applied to federal entities,22 financial reporting practices in
the United States23 are prescribed by private organizations.24  For the business
sector, reporting standards are set by the FASB; for the public sector, the 
standards are set by the GASB. Both the FASB and the GASB are private
entities, organized as not-for-profit Delaware non-stock corporations.25 
Although the two organizations maintain high levels of transparency in their 
work and meticulously adhere to due process procedures,26 they are still
private organizations and, as such, are not subject to the administrative 
duties or obligations imposed by administrative law;27 for example, compliance 
with the Administrative Procedure Act.28  Nevertheless, the FASB and the 
GASB possess great administrative and regulatory power over the entire 
22. See infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
23. In contrast to the Anglo-American approach for accounting standard-setting—
as prevailing in the U.S. and U.K and other countries influenced by the U.S.—the Continental
approach—as prevailing in many European countries and at the level of the European
Union—establishes accounting standards through legislation. Cf. JOHN FLOWER, EUROPEAN 
FINANCIAL REPORTING: ADAPTING TO A CHANGING WORLD 76 (2004) (discussing the regulation
of financial reporting in Europe with an emphasis on changes created by the adoption of 
international financial reporting standards (IFRS)). 
24. Federal entities are implementing FASAB standards, which are set by a federal
board. See infra notes 195–98. 
25. The FASB and the GASB are held by a shared parent company, the Financial 
Accounting Foundation (FAF), which is another not-for-profit, non-stock Delaware corporation.
About the FAF, FIN. ACCT. FOUND., http://www.accountingfoundation.org/cs/Content 
Server?c=Page&pagename=Foundation%2FPage%2FFAFSectionPage&cid=117615779
0151 [https://perma.cc/N9RW-MTGM].
26. See GASB Standard Setting Process, GOVERNMENTAL ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD,
http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Page/GASBSectionPage&cid=1176156714545 [https:// 
perma.cc/FYE6-YNGF]; Standard-Setting Process, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http:// 
www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1351027215692 [https://perma.cc/R8AV- 
RS9Q].
27. Cf. Omar Ochoa, Accounting for FASB: Why Administrative Law Should Apply 
to the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 489, 496 (2011)
(noting that the SEC itself has stated “that FASB is not an agency”).
28. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).  The APA is a federal statute that,
inter alia, governs the way in which administrative agencies of the federal government 
may propose and establish regulations or their rule-making power. See also Arthur Andersen
& Co. v. SEC, No. 76C-2832, 1978 WL 1073, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 1978) (a failed
attempt to challenge ASR 150 (infra note 32) as unconstitutional).
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U.S. financial reporting sphere.29  Disclosure standards promulgated by
these bodies have substantial effects on the economy30 and, with respect 
to the FASB, warrant financial markets’ attention, sometimes even that of 
the Congress.31 
29. For hundreds of years the practices used in maintaining book records had developed 
by those who were, in practice, engaged in recording commerce transactions into accounts, 
and the records were designed for their own use. It was the merchant in his own store who
was recording sales into accounts during business hours, employing practices which allowed
him to know its daily profit, and restocking  inventory to assure no shoplifting occurred. 
Accordingly, the guides for accounting practices were designed for the use of merchants. 
Cf. David E. Tinius & William L. Weis, Introduction to FRA LUCA PACIOLI, PARTICULARIS
DE COMPUTIS ET SCRIPTURIS (Jeremy Cripps trans., 1995) (noting that Luca Pacioli’s Summa de
Arithmetica, Geometria, Proportioni et Proportionalita, published in 1498, is the first-
ever known accounting codex).  However, with the passage of time, book records became 
important for other purposes.  Corporations started raising funds from the public, and disclosure
requirements became a necessary tool in protecting investors.  Book records, which were
maintained in the past solely for the use of the owner, became important for the public as 
a whole. See Ben McClure, The Importance of Corporate Transparency, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental/03/121703.asp [https://perma.cc/9CN3- 
B2XQ].
30. Cf. George J. Benston & Melvin A. Krasney, The Economic Consequences of
Financial Accounting Statements, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS: SELECTED PAPERS 159, 159–60 (1978); Stephen A. Zeff, The Rise of “Economic 
Consequences,” J. ACCOUNTANCY 56, Dec. 1978, at 56, 56. 
31. One of the most famous issues that attracted a congressional intervention, though it
did not result in a final effective statute, is the accounting treatment of stock options issued
to company employees.  In 1972, the Accounting Principles Board published the board’s 
Opinion No. 25, “Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees,” under which the issuing of
stock options to employees generally resulted in recognition of no compensation cost to 
the employer—the company.  ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BD., OPINION NO. 25: ACCOUNTING 
FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES (1972), https://dart.deloitte.com/resource/1/d02fdc63-3f36­
11e6-95db-118fea65af4c [https://perma.cc/ZMN7-AM2B]; see infra text accompanying 
note 39. In 1993, the FASB, which replaced the AICPA Accounting Principles Board in 
1973, then issued an exposure draft for a new standard to replace Opinion No. 25.  In 
contradiction to the accounting treatment promulgated under Opinion No. 25, the proposed 
Standard required the expensing of employee stock options at fair value.  The implications 
of the change were tremendous: While Opinion No. 25 incentivized companies to remunerate 
employees with stock options, as they were not recorded as expenses, the proposed Standard
repealed that incentive and created a counter-incentive for issuing options to employees. 
Remuneration through stock options had to be recorded as an expense equal to the options’ 
fair value, which many times forced the company to recognize expenses higher than the 
options’ practical value for the employees—who could not sell them immediately.  This 
change could heavily affect start-up companies in which the practice of remuneration by
stock option in lieu of cash payments was very common.  In response to industry pressure,
Senator Joe Lieberman introduced a bill in the Senate that prohibited the SEC from requiring 
the issuer to recognize any expense in financial statements resulting from granting options 
to its employees in connection with the performance of services.  Equity Expansion Act 
of 1993, S. 1175, 103d Cong. § 4.  A similar bill was also introduced in the House of 
Representatives by Representative Lewis F. Payne, Jr.  Equity Expansion Act of 1993, 
H.R. 2759, 103d Cong.  In response to the intense political and industry pressure, the FASB 
modified its proposal to allow firms to substitute the proposed accounting treatment with 
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A. The Business Sector
The FASB owes its status as the prominent accounting prescriber for 
the business sector to the SEC.32  Although empowered with the authority 
to prescribe methods to be followed in the preparation of accounts, including 
the form and content of financial statements disclosed according to various
legislation,33 the SEC rarely exercises these powers.34  Instead, the SEC
historically looked to standard-setting bodies designated by the private market, 
specifically, the accounting profession, thus the FASB and its predecessors— 
those existing in Opinion No. 25, and the final version of the Standard allowed firms to 
continue reporting no expenses for issuing stock options to employees—nevertheless, companies 
were required to disclose the options’ fair value in the notes to the financial statements. 
See Summary of Statement No. 123, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD (Oct. 1995), http://www. 
fasb.org/summary/stsum123.shtml [https://perma.cc/9ASU-8ZE8]. The same story repeated
itself in 2003 when corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002 encouraged the FASB to reopen 
the employee stock option debate by adding the subject to its agenda.  Consequently, the 
Broad-Based Stock Option Plan Transparency Act and the Stock Option Accounting Reform
Act were introduced.  These prohibited the SEC from recognizing as GAAP any new standard 
on accounting for employee stock options and prevented the mandatory expensing of stock
options granted to any employee, except a firm’s chief executive officer and the four most
highly compensated executive officers.  Stock Option Accounting Reform Act, H.R. 3574,
108th Cong. (2004); Broad-Based Stock Option Plan Transparency Act of 2003, H.R. 1372, 
108th Cong.  Although the latter act passed the House of Representatives and was referred
to the Senate, it faced a group of influential Senators who, along with others, such as Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and Treasury Secretary John Snow, all supported the 
FASB’s proposed accounting for stock options and opposed congressional intervention of 
the issue.  The Bill was buried in the Senate and resulted in no effective statute. See David 
B. Farber et al., Congressional Intervention in the Standard-Setting Process: An Analysis 
of the Stock Option Accounting Reform Act of 2004, 21 ACCT. HORIZONS 1 (2007) (reviewing the
political effort to block option expensing); Denise A. Jones & Kimberly J. Smith, Employee
Stock Options: A Standard Setting Saga, 8 J. BUS. CASE STUD. 241, 244–51 (2012). 
32. Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting
Principles and Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150, 3 SEC Docket 275 (Dec. 20,
1973) [hereinafter ASR No. 150] (recognizing accounting and reporting standards promulgated 
by the FASB as generally accepted accounting principles for the purposes of securities 
acts).
33. See Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2012); Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (2012) (noting the Commission’s authority to
prescribe the items or details to be shown in the balance sheet and the earnings statement 
and the methods to be followed in the preparation of such financial reports submitted to
the Commission and published to investors). 
34. See Zeff, supra note 30, at 57–59 (discussing all occasions up to 1978 in which
the SEC intervened in accounting standard setting). 
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“to provide leadership in establishing and improving accounting principles”
governing disclosure.35 
In the 1930s, when the Securities Acts were enacted and, among other 
things, the SEC was created,36 the accounting profession was already self-
regulating the practices used in preparing financial statements.37  At that
time, these practices were seen as satisfactory,38 and hence, the newly 
established SEC elected to continue the existing situation and have the private
market continue its role in promoting accounting standards.  In the 1970s,
when the FASB was established as a full-time independent private body, 
replacing an existing part-time technical committee of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)—the Accounting Principle 
Boards (APB)39—the SEC’s practice of de facto empowering a private 
organization with administrative authorities40 was challenged on constitutional
grounds by accounting firms.41  Although that attempt did not succeed,42 
in the years that followed, legal scholars heavily criticized the SEC’s practice 
and the court’s inadequate deliberation of the matter.43  Eventually, among 
35. ASR No. 150, supra note 32; see Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with 
Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
975, 983–89 (2005); see, e.g., Stephen A. Zeff, The Evolution of U.S. GAAP: The Political 
Forces Behind Professional Standards, CPA J., Feb. 2005, at 19, 19 (chronicling the rising 
importance of financial accounting standards and the resulting increased special-interest 
lobbying). 
36.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2016). 
37. Mainly through the work of designated committees appointed by the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and before it, the American Institute of Accountants.
See STEPHEN A. ZEFF, FORGING ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES IN FIVE COUNTRIES: A HISTORY 
AND AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS 119–40 (1972) (describing the AICPA committees engaged 
in accounting standards promulgation during the 1930s); Nagy, supra note 35, at 986. 
38. See Stephen A. Zeff, How the U.S. Accounting Profession Got Where It Is Today: 
Part I, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 189, 191 (2003) (“Federal agencies sought the advice of the 
organized accounting profession because of its growing reputation.”).
39. The replacement of the APB with the FASB was a result of the SEC and the market
losing confidence in the APB.  See Stephen A. Zeff, The Wheat Study on Establishment of 
Accounting Principles (1971–72): A Historical Study, 34 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 146, 147 
(2015).
40. ASR No. 150, supra note 32. 
41. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen & Co. v. SEC, No. 76C-2832, 1978 WL 1073, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 1978); Nagy, supra note 35, at 987. 
42. Arthur Andersen & Co., 1978 WL 1073, at *4–5; Nagy, supra note 35, at 987. 
43. See, e.g., Ronald E. Large, Note, SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150: A 
Critical Analysis, 54 IND. L.J. 317, 320–21 (1979) (arguing that SEC recognition in the 
case should have been seen as a substantive rule); see also HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 153 (1979) (“The
determination of what accounting should mean is the SEC’s most important job—too
important to be left to others.”); Mundstock, supra note 15, at 827 (“The SEC has been 
composed primarily of lawyers. Lawyers do not want to be bothered by accounting, which 
they view as merely ‘technical.’ Hence, the SEC has been willing to leave accounting to
574
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other changes the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act44 applied to the accounting 
profession, it explicitly approved the SEC’s practice.  Section 108 of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act explicitly allows the SEC to recognize45 private
organizations as standards promulgators for purposes of the securities laws.46 
In a policy statement47 following the enactment, the SEC, after finding the
organization satisfied all criteria stipulated in §108 of the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act, reaffirmed the status of the FASB. 
Accordingly, the FASB’s financial accounting standards are recognized
today as generally accepted for purposes of the federal securities laws, and
companies subject to these acts are required to comply with those standards 
in the preparation of their financial statements, unless the SEC directs 
otherwise.48 
the accountants.”); Nagy, supra note 35, at 983–1006 (discussing the accounting profession and
the need for reform). 
44. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code). 
45. Id. § 108(b)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
46.  However, the private organization must fulfill the criteria set in the act:
In carrying out its authority . . . the Commission may recognize, as “generally accepted” 
for purposes of the securities laws, any accounting principles established by a standard
setting body—
(A) that—
(i) is organized as a private entity; 
(ii) has . . . a board of trustees . . . ; 
(iii) is funded [by annual accounting support fees per 15 U.S.C. § 7219 
(2012)] . . . ; 
(iv) has adopted procedures to ensure prompt consideration, by majority
vote of its members, of changes to accounting principles necessary to
reflect emerging accounting issues and changing business practices; 
and (v) considers, in adopting accounting principles, the need to keep 
standards current in order to reflect changes in the business 
environment . . . ; 
. . . .
Id.
47. Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated 
Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 33-8221, 80 SEC Docket 139 
(Apr. 25, 2003).
48. As a general rule, corporations in America are not legally required to prepare 
financial statements or to file any other timely presentations of their financial position or
operation results.  Hence, unlike European corporations, which are legally required to 
prepare annual financial statements using accounting rules included in the civil code and 
filed with a state agency, U.S. corporations can choose whether to prepare financial statements, 
and according to what practices, if at all.  See generally FLOWER, supra note 23, at 50, 56, 
68–69 (discussing the financial reporting practices in Europe).  A legal requirement for
financial reporting is raised in cases only where a specific legal regime becomes applicable
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With a contribution from the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct
Section 1.320—requiring AICPA members to follow FASB standards for 
all business entities49—FASB’s SEC-recognized status with respect to the
securities law also extends to business clusters in addition to those subject 
to securities regulations,50 resulting in the FASB being the prominent
standards promulgator for the entire business sector.51 
B. The Public Sector 
Concern over affairs of local government and uniformity of financial 
reporting began in the 20th century when early reformers52 attempted to
develop uniform formats for reporting by municipalities.53  However, public
sector financials did not draw broad attention until the mid-1970s and the
early 1980s, when big U.S. cities, among them New York and Chicago,54 
facing the risk of insolvency due to dubious financial management,55 
heightened public awareness of local government financial accounting56 
and disclosure practices, making it a national issue.57 
to the corporation, then a defined objective for the reporting is established which also determines 
the format and content of reporting; for example, once a corporation raises, or wishes to 
raise, capital from the public, it becomes subject to securities regulation and to its legal 
obligation for preparing and submitting financial statements that will provide information 
for investors. However, until a corporation elects to raise capital from the public, no legal
obligations for financial reporting exist. 
49. See AICPACODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
2014), http://pub.aicpa.org/codeofconduct/ethicsresources/et-cod.pdf [https://perma.cc/UUM8- 
GFYN].
50. Petro Lisowsky & Michael Minnis, Accounting Choices and Capital Allocation:
Evidence from Large Private U.S. Firms 31 (Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Working
Paper No. 14-01, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2373498 (indicating a GAAP-use ratio 
of seventy-nine percent among private companies surveyed in the study). 
51. See Klein, supra note 16, at 600 (describing the overall normative structure that 
governs the GAAP).
 52. See generally William C. Rivenbark, A Historical Overview of Cost Accounting 
in Local Government, 37 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 217, 217 (2005) (providing a historical 
overview of cost accounting development in local governments, including the contribution 
made by the progressive movement to the process). 
53. Martin Ives, The GASB: A Fresh Look at Governmental Accounting and Financial 
Reporting, 8 J. Acct., Auditing, & Fin., 253, 257 (1985); id.
54. Chicago’s financial system currently faces challenges.  See Bachrach, supra note 1. 
55. See Arthur Allen & George D. Sanders, Financial Disclosure in US Municipalities:
Has the Governmental Accounting Standards Board Made a Difference?, 10 FIN.ACCOUNTABILITY
& MGMT. 175, 177 (1994); James L. Chan, The Birth of the Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board: How? Why? What Next?, 1 RES. GOVERNMENTAL & NON-PROFIT ACCT.
3, 6 (1985). 
56. See Rivenbark, supra note 52, at 217. 
57.  Allen & Sanders, supra note 55, at 178. 
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Following Senate initiatives in 1979 and 198158 to place the development
of standards for state and local governments under a federal governmental 
body,59 local government executives and those organizations already holding
stakes in prescribing accounting practices for the public sector60—for 
example, AICPA, which published its own auditing guide for local government
accounts in 197461—united in an effort to prevent the federal government 
from being involved in setting accounting standards for local governments.62 
Although the bill failed in the Senate, the credibility of the existing arrangement
of standard setting—the National Council on Governmental Accounting 
(NCGA)63—continued to erode,64 eventually forcing65 all parties involved
to accept a formula that those engaged either from the public sector or the
private sector66 could live with, and that would foster cooperation.67  The
58. In 1979, Senator Harrison A. Williams introduced a bill to create a “State and 
Local Government Accounting and Financial Reporting Standards Council,” comprised of 
the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Controller General of the United States, and the Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or their designees.  Drafts of the bill had been 
circulated while interactions between involved parties continued, which lead, in part, to
the establishment of a study group on the structure for setting state and local governmental 
accounting standards. Nonetheless, after complaining about “foot dragging,” Senator Williams 
resurrected the bill in 1981.  Chan, supra note 55, at 8 (describing the bill and its supporters);
see also infra text accompanying note 211. 
59. State and Local Government Accounting and Financial Reporting Standards 
Act of 1979, S. 1236, 96th Cong.; see Chan, supra note 55, at 7; Ives, supra note 53, at 253. 
60. For the process of developing standards, and a look at those involved, see Allen 
& Sanders, supra note 55, at 177–78 and Chan, supra note 55, at 8. 
61. Chan, supra note 55, at 9.
 62. See id. at 10.
63. The NCGA was a council of volunteers, originally established in 1934 as the 
National Committee on Municipal Accounting by the Municipal Finance Officers Association 
of the United States and Canada (MFOA).  The council met only two to four times a year, 
for two or three days.  Frank L. Greathouse, The History and Evolution of the National Council 
on Governmental Accounting, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Summer 1985, at 23, 23–24. 
64. Allen & Sanders, supra note 55, at 178 (citing Chan, supra note 55, at 6); id. at
24 (describing structural and procedural problems with the NCGA). 
65. See Chan, supra note 55, at 9–15 (describing the grueling process that preceded
the establishment of the GASB). 
66. See Helen M. Roybark et al., The First Quarter Century of the GASB (1984–
2009): A Perspective on Standard Setting (Part One), 48 ABACUS 1, 11 (2012) (“The GASB 
was formed by agreement between the [FAF], the [AICPA], the Government Finance Officers 
Association, the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers, and 
the seven organizations representing state and local government officials.”).
67. G. Robert Smith, Jr., The Growth of GAAP, in HANDBOOK OF GOVERNMENTAL
ACCOUNTING 1, 9–10 (Frederic B. Bogui ed., 2009) (discussing the organizations that 
support the GASB). 
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formula included the establishment of a distinct and new standard-setting 
board engaged exclusively68 in promoting public sector accounting; however, 
subject to the oversight of the existing69 Financial Accounting Foundation
(FAF),70 which also oversaw and controlled the FASB.71 
Unlike the FASB, which enjoys an authoritative status over business
entities, supported by recognition of the SEC and the agency’s cohesive 
power, the GASB’s status results from its standards being voluntarily accepted 
by state and local governments.72  Although the GASB is designated by
the AICPA as the exclusive promulgator of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) for state and local government entities73—as the FASB
is for business entities74—public entities are not legally obligated by 
Congress or any federal authority to implement GAAP, and therefore they
 68. See also Roybark et al., supra note 66, at 17–19 (discussing early conflicts over 
jurisdiction of the FASB). 
69. A recommendation for the establishment of a new Governmental Accounting
Foundation (GAF), with a majority of trustees associated with the public sector, was not 
accepted. See Chan, supra note 55, at 11. 
70. The FAF is an independent, private-sector organization with responsibility for 
the oversight, administration, and finances of its standard-setting boards, the FASB and 
the GASB.  It is a non-stock Delaware corporation that operates exclusively for charitable, 
educational, scientific, and literary purposes within the meaning of § 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code. About the FAF, FIN. ACCT. FOUND., http://www.accountingfoundation.org/cs/
ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=Foundation%2FPage%2FFAFSectionPage&cid=117
6157790151 [https://perma.cc/JEF6-ZCEH]. 
71. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
72. GOVERNMENTALACCOUNTINGSTANDARDS BD., GASB AT AGLANCE ¶ 8, http://www. 
gasb.org/facts/gasb_at_a_glance.pdf [https://perma.cc/UD3E-3B3D] (“The GASB is not 
a federal agency.  The federal government does not fund GASB, and its standards are not 
federal laws or rules.  The GASB does not have enforcement authority to require governments 
to comply with its standards.”). 
73. Section 1.310 of the AICPA Code of Conduct requires all AICPA members—
over 400,000 accountants in 144 countries—to adhere to accounting standards set by the 
organizations endorsed by the Institute. See AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT §
1.310.001.01 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2014), http://pub.aicpa.org/code 
ofconduct/ethicsresources/et-cod.pdf [https://perma.cc/UUM8-GFYN]; AICPA, FINANCIALS:
2014-15 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2015), https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/about/annual 
reports/downloadabledocuments/2014-2015-annual-financials.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GJ7-DDZ4].
Similarly, § 1.320 prohibits an AICPA member from “express[ing] an opinion or stat[ing]
affirmatively that the financial statements . . . are presented in conformance with generally accepted
accounting principles . . . if such statements . . .  contain any departure from an accounting
principle promulgated by bodies designated by [AICPA Governing Council] to establish 
such principles . . . .” AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra, § 1.320.001.01. 
To date, only three organizations, besides AICPA itself, are endorsed by AICPA for the 
purpose of setting accounting standards for Institute members: The FASB, for setting 
standards used in for-profit reporting; the GASB, for state and local governmental entities;
and the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB), for establishing financial 
accounting principles for federal governmental entities.  Id. § 1.320.040.01.  Other organizations, 
such as the PCAOB and the IASB, are endorsed for other objectives. Id. at 156. 
74. Id. § 0.400.10.
578
KLEIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/15/2018 10:58 AM      
 
    
 












   
    
 
 
       
  
     
 
  
   
      
    
   
 
 
    
       
 
 
[VOL. 54:  565, 2017] It’s Time to Mind the GASB 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
can choose75 to use some other comprehensive basis of accounting (OCBOA)
for their reports. Accordingly, while a significant number of states voluntarily 
adopted GASB standards,76 a significant number of states and governments
still use OCBOA instead of GAAP.77 
Two recent research studies show the dominance of GASB standards in 
public sector reporting, and especially the lack of any other concrete alternative
except for use of OCBOA, which is not systematically promulgated by
any recognized accounting body but is, rather, the accounting method used
de facto by the entity.  The studies also provide a picture of the remaining
terrain in which entities use OCBOA.
The first study, published by the GASB in 2008, reports that thirty-six 
states have actively adopted GASB standards, requiring by state law or 
regulation the implementation of GASB standards by political subdivisions.78 
The study estimates that 25.9% of all counties, localities, and independent 
school districts in the United States are required by state law or regulation 
to prepare GAAP financial statements.79  With respect to actual implementation 
of GASB standards, regardless of whether there is a legal requirement
to implement GASB standards or not,80 the study estimates that 67.3% to 
75. Vivian L. Carpenter & Ehsan H. Feroz, Institutional Theory and Accounting
Rule Choice: An Analysis of Four US State Governments’ Decisions To Adopt Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles, 26 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y 565, 588 (2001) (exploring how 
institutional pressures exerted on four state governments—New York, Michigan, Ohio, 
and Delaware—influenced the decision of these governments to adopt or resist the use of
GAAP).
76. States endorse GASB standards for internal uses, such as budget preparation, and,
many times, require local subdivisions, like counties, and state governed entities, like hospitals, 
to apply GASB standards. See James Chen & Xu Yunxiao, Setting Government Accounting 
Standards: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of China and the United States, in
IMPLEMENTING REFORMS IN PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING 89, 102, 105–07 (Susana Jorge 
ed., 2008).
77.  For a list of countries that use OCBOA, see infra note 86. 
78. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., RESEARCH BRIEF: STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT USE OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR GENERAL
PURPOSE EXTERNAL FINANCIAL REPORTING 3 (2008), http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?
site=GASB&c=Document_C&pagename=GASB%2FDocument_C%2FGASBDocument
Page&cid=1176156726669 [https://perma.cc/D3GY-W96D].
79. Id. at 4. 
80. In several states that do not require GAAP, “many [local] governments actually
do follow GAAP.”  Id. at 8.  “For instance, more than half of the localities in California received
the Government Finance Officers Association’s Certificate of Achievement for Excellence 
in Financial Reporting in 2005, which cannot be awarded without GAAP compliance.” 
Id.
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71.5% of the state and local governments included in the study81 follow
GAAP when preparing their annual financial statements.  Hence, the remaining 
32.7% to 28.5% of these public entities use OCBOA.
These findings are supported by another and more updated research study 
published in February 2016, focusing specifically on counties.82  The 2016 
research study reveals that counties in forty-five states use GASB standards 
for financial reporting.83  “Thirty-two [] states require counties to follow 
GAAP and 295 counties in another [thirteen] states and the District of Columbia
choose to” voluntarily file their financial reports according to GASB 
standards.84  As a result, “almost three-quarters (71[%]) of [all] counties
report[] their annual financial information” following GASB standards,85 
indicating an OCBOA use rate equal to 29% among counties.86 
The data show that although the GASB did not receive wide recognition 
in its early years—during the 1980s87—it has been fueled by the support 
81. “The estimation of GAAP compliance ranging from 67.3[%] to 71.5[%] relates 
only to the state and local governments included in the study and should not be construed 
as the proportion of all such entities in the United States.  The estimated range—21,003
to 22,328 entities—relates to the largest 31,221 governments.  These proportions should not be
portrayed as the overall proportion of GAAP compliance in the United States.”  Id. at 7. 
82. Emilia Istrate et al., Counting Money: State & GASB Standards for County 
Financial Reporting, NACO POL’Y RES. PAPER SERIES (Nat’l Ass’n of Countries, Wash., 
D.C.), Feb. 2016, at 1 http://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/Counting%20 
Money_Executive%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FBL-NELG].  “Counties provide
essential services to more than 308 million residents across the country to keep communities
prosperous, safe and secure. . . .  [C]ounty governments operate in a constrained financial 
environment, conforming to state and federal mandates and limited by state caps on their 
ability to raise revenue.” Id.
 83. Id. at 2. 
84. Id.
 85. Id. at 6. 
86. According to the study, state specific rules for financial reporting are the standard 
for about one-fifth of county governments.  Nineteen percent of counties use a financial 
reporting format decided by their state and OCBOA.  Nine states—Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Vermont, and Washington—ask counties to
follow an alternative method of financial reporting and accounting to the GASB standard. 
“[T]he state determines the framework, including measurement, recognition, presentation
and disclosure requirements of the county financial reports.” Id. at 4. 
87.  Roybark et al., supra note 66, at 14. 
580
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of the FAF,88 and conquered89 the public sector, while winning the ongoing 
competition with OCBOA.90 
This voluntarily-adopted dominance of the GASB in the public sector 
raises a number of questions: Has its rapid conquest of public sector accounting 
exacted a price at the standards level?  In other words: Did GASB standards
hold some special characteristics that appealed to state politicians and 
public entity executives?91 Did efforts expended in becoming a prominent
standard-setter like its older brother, the FASB, influence the GASB in 
designing reporting standards?  Although a full historical analysis of GASB
efforts to gain status and acceptance is beyond the scope of this Article,
as further discussed in the next sections, the objectives GASB designated
for financial reporting to fulfill, as well as repeal of specific pension 
disclosures,92 all promulgated during the time the GASB was establishing 
88. Id. at 12 (stating that the FAF supported, and the FASB contributed to, “achieving 
and maintaining its legitimacy as the recognized governmental accounting standard-
setting body, at a time when a number of competing interest groups were unable to secure 
recognition as an alternative body to the GASB”). 
89. Nonetheless, in comparison with the 67.3% to 71.5% use rate of GASB standards
in the public sector, in the business sector, FASB standards are used by 100% of public 
companies subject to SEC regulation, except foreign private issuers, and the majority of all
other business entities. See Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements
Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards Without
Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, Securities Act Release No. 33-8879, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-57026, 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (Jan. 4, 2008) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 230, 239, 
249); Lisowsky & Minnis, supra note 50, at 31 (reporting that almost 80% of the firms 
included in the study’s sample use GAAP, meaning FASB standards, as the basis of accounting 
for their financial records). 
90. Local governments may use OCBOA for several reasons.  Small county governments, 
for example, might prefer OCBOA over GASB standards due to the lack of an actual
contribution of accrual based accounting to small-scale budgetary and administrative
decision-making.  See Istrate et al., supra note 82, at 8.  Preparing financial statements
following GASB standards may be labor intensive yet useless for counties that adequately
track annual financial activities on a cash basis. Id.; see also Beermann, supra note 3, at
27 (listing additional reasons for local governments to use OCBOA). 
91. “The decision to use GAAP for external financial reporting is an expensive one, 
involving many actors in the legislative and executive branches of state government who 
must be educated and persuaded that GAAP-based financial reporting is needed.”  Carpenter &
Feroz, supra note 75, at 588.
 92. See Beermann, supra note 3, at 27 (explaining how “unfunded pension promises 
benefit politicians in two ways”: (1) “they allow current officials to provide services without
requiring taxpayers to pay for them until much later”; and (2) “help politicians shore  up support
among government workers”). 
 581
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its accounting status while striving for leadership,93 suggest some disturbing 
findings especially when compared with similar standards promulgated 
by other standard-setters such as the Federal Advisory Board and the NCGA, 
the GASB’s predecessor.94 
These questions become even more acute when the lack of actual 
justification for such delegation and privatization are exposed and the full
implications of delegating accounting standard-setting powers, as described
in the following two sections, are introduced into the discussion. 




As mentioned above, for both the business and public sectors, accounting
standard-setting, and hence setting of disclosure practices, went private. 
During the years since this institutional approach was established, a number
of justifications were suggested in support of such arrangements for disclosure 
standard-setting.95  Nevertheless, legal contemplation96 of the privatization 
of disclosure standard-setting had taken place in the context of business sector 
accounting and in particular, with the SEC’s endorsement of FASB standards 
and its predecessors.97  Accordingly, these justifications were never deliberated 
in the context of the public sector and the GASB.  As explained below, 
although justification for disclosure standard-setting privatization might
provide adequate reasoning in business sector accounting and reporting,98 it 
does not in the case of the public sector. 
A. Extrinsic Efficiency 
The most prominent justification for the privatization of accounting
standard-setting focuses on the extrinsic benefits—that is, benefits seen as
such from the standard setter’s perspective—that result from utilizing 
specialization and expertise in the private market in lieu of establishing 
93. See also Dale L. Flesher & Annette Pridgen, The Development of Hospital Financial 
Accounting in the USA, 25 ACCT. HIS. REV. 201, 208–09 (2015) (describing how states 
threatening to establish an alternative standard-setter, independent of the FAF, caused the 
FAF to change jurisdictional limitation between the GASB and the FASB). 
94. See Greathouse, supra note 63, at 24. 
95. See sources cited supra note 15. 
96. Cf. KRIPKE, supra note 43, at 153 (arguing against the delegation and privatization
of accounting standard-setting powers); Mundstock, supra note 15, at 817–24 (“[T]here is 
no apparent reason to be in favor of private setting of accounting standards, and many reasons
to be opposed.”); Nagy, supra note 35, at 983. 
97. See sources cited supra note 15.
 98. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, 
Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 981 (2003) (“Giving the 
SEC sole direct power could further politicize the standard-setting process.”).
582
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and developing these assets by the public agency. First, ex ante, when
launching a regime that promotes cohesive uniformity in accounting practice,
the use of existing private market knowledge is a substitute for “acquiring . . .
expertise through lengthy and costly training” by the governmental authority.99 
Second, ex-post, maintenance of specialized expertise, as required in order 
to promote new and adapt existing standards, provided by a private agent 
is perceived to be “more efficient” and therefore also more likely to occur. 
The public servant uses the specialized expertise solely for the purpose of
regulation, therefore making maintenance of “expertise more costly” than 
using private actors who “derive positive externalities from [their] expertise”
—by utilizing it in other services provided to the private market, for example, 
consulting services.100 
The positive externalities associated with private standard-setting not 
only make the private promulgation of accounting standards overall more 
cost-efficient, and therefore more desirable in broad social terms, they also
create better incentives against stagnation.101  Altering existing disclosure
requirements creates expenses for the regulator and does not usually create 
any observable additional benefit for the regulator.  New disclosures, keeping
up with market changes, will not necessarily result in an observable improvement
in regulatory work.  In most scenarios it will only prevent deterioration of 
the regulatory function.  Moreover, the regulator is not only required to invest
resources in developing new standards and adjusting existing regulatory
procedures to monitor the new disclosures, but also to bear the risk of failure 
of the new revised requirement. In contrast, a private agent derives additional
benefits from altered disclosure requirements mainly by advising existing 
clients who now need to adapt practices. Although a risk of unnecessary
opportunistic changes of the prevailing practice must be mitigated,102 a 
private standard-setter is expected to be less in favor of unwanted stagnation.
 99. Mattli & Büthe, supra note 15, at 230 (discussing general reasons for delegating
governance functions to a private actor). 
100. Id. at 230–31. 
101. See Hawes, supra note 15, at 210. 
102. The risk can be mitigated by having market firm representatives as members of 
the standard-setting board.  This approach is adopted by private standard-setters, such as
the FASB and the GASB. 
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B. Intrinsic Efficiency 
Another justification for placing accounting standard-setting out of reach 
of state agencies is the wish to keep accounting disclosures intrinsically 
efficient and without unnecessary political biases on reported numbers.103 
When inadequate disclosure exists, investors will request an additional 
premium for their money due to the excessive risk engendered by sub­
optimal disclosure because, for example, ex-ante, not enough information 
is provided in order to know whether a company is a washout or not; ex-
post, there is not enough information to know how well the company is 
being managed.104  So as to reduce their cost-of-capital, firms themselves
will invest in producing better disclosures.105  Because presumably efficient 
disclosure was already created by the market itself, non-market regulation, as
levied by the SEC for example, would only serve to make disclosures less 
efficient.106 
Another risk created by governmental regulation of disclosure is political 
sway over the content of the disclosure.107  For example, a case in point, 
which required companies that received investment tax subsidies given as
small yearly tax benefits, to report them as a one-time, larger sum.108  Such
 103. Cf. David F. Hawkins, The Saxe Lectures in Accounting: Financial Accounting, 
the Standards Board and Economic Development, BARUCH C. (Nov. 12, 1973), http://www.
baruch.cuny.edu/library/alumni/online_exhibits/digital/saxe/saxe_1973/hawkins_73.htm
(“I believe that those responsible for determining accounting standards, such as the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, should strive to set accounting standards that are 
technically and behaviorally sound and that are not at variance with the national economic
goals and the government’s programs to achieve these goals.”).
104. Cf. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970) (knowing only average quality of
cars being sold can result in non-functional market and no trades).
105. See also Ronald A. Dye, Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information, 23 J. ACCT.
RES. 123, 142 (1985) (suggesting an explanatory disclosure model based on actual information
availability); Robert E. Verrecchia, Discretionary Disclosure, 5 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179, 
180 (1983) (suggesting an explanatory disclosure model based on disclosure-related costs). 
106. But cf. Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial
Disclosure Regulation and Externalities, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 479, 480 (2000) (arguing that 
the market will not always produce an optimal disclosure setting); BARUCH LEV & FENG
GU, THE END OF ACCOUNTING AND THE PATH FORWARD FOR INVESTORS AND MANAGERS
(2016) (reporting contemporary financial accounting disclosures’ continuous deterioration
in relevance to investors’ decisions) 
107. Cf. Hawkins, supra note 103 (suggesting that those responsible for determining 
accounting standards should strive to set standards that are not at variance with the national 
economic goals and the government’s programs to achieve these goals). 
108. See, e.g., Maurice Moonitz, Some Reflections on the Investment Credit Experience, 
4 J. ACCT. RES. 47, 47 (1966) (discussing accounting treatment of the investment tax credit 
and the government’s struggle with the accounting profession’s view of credit as income
in the single year the credit is given, and not throughout the life period of the investment); 
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political influence makes reported numbers convey a different story and 
is not what statement users are seeking to learn—that is, the subsidies’
actual effect on the prospective cash inflow: a small amount every year—again,
resulting in sub-optimal or even distorted and misleading disclosures. 
C. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Efficiency in the Public Sector 
Extrinsic and intrinsic efficiency justifications can support, to some extent, 
privatization of accounting standard-setting for the private market.109 
Nevertheless, when public sector accounting is considered, the support 
value of some of these justifications decreases substantially.
While business firms’ financial statements are expected primarily to 
communicate information to investors making investment decisions and 
monitoring manager performance,110 the public entities’ financial statements
are expected to fulfill the needs of a much larger group of users111 engaged
in activities other than making investments.112  Among these users is the
public entity itself, in fulfilling its duty to be publicly accountable for 
Zeff, supra note 30, at 57 (discussing governmental intervention in the accounting treatment of
the investment tax credit).
109. But cf. Mundstock, supra note 15, at 814 (arguing against such justifications).
110. See infra text accompanying note 152. 
111. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., CONCEPTS STATEMENT NO. 1 OF 
THE GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD:OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING, 
at i (1987) [hereinafter GASB CONCEPTS STATEMENT NO. 1] (“The Board has identified
three groups as the primary users of external state and local governmental financial reports: 
the citizenry, legislative and oversight bodies, and investors and creditors.”).  See generally
Chan, supra note 55, at 6 (mentioning how well-publicized financial crises in New York,
Cleveland, and Chicago during 1974 to 1980 heightened public awareness of governmental
finance); David L. Cotton, Federal Accounting Standards: Close Enough for Government 
Work?, ARMED FORCES COMPTROLLER, Summer 2000, at 34, 38 (looking at a few GASB
actions and deliberations to illustrate some of the pressures the GASB faces).
112. GASB CONCEPTS STATEMENT NO. 1, supra note 111, at i (“Financial reports are 
used primarily to compare actual financial results with the legally adopted budget; to assess 
financial condition and results of operations; to assist in determining compliance with finance-
related laws, rules, and regulations; and to assist in evaluating efficiency and effectiveness.”);
see also GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., GASB WHITE PAPER: WHY
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING IS—AND SHOULD BE—DIFFERENT,
at ii (2017) [hereinafter GASB WHITE PAPER], http://gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=
Document_C&pagename=GASB%2FDocument_C%2FDocumentPage&cid=117616937
1273 [https://perma.cc/KKF8-7XVC] (“[M]ost governments do not operate in a competitive 
marketplace, face little or no threat of liquidation, and do not have equity owners.  Consequently, 
measures of net income and earnings per share have no meaning to users of governmental
financial reports.  Instead, users need information to assess a government’s stewardship of 
public resources . . . .”).
 585



















    
 
    
   
  
    




monies raised through taxes and for their expenditure in accordance with 
appropriations laws;113 the general public and the media, when evaluating
the service efforts, costs, and accomplishments of the public entity; and, in 
assessing the impact on the country of the public entity’s operations and
investments and how, as a result, the entity’s and the local government’s 
financial condition has changed and may change in the future.
The information required for these activities is very different than the 
information required for capital investment decisions.  For example, an
investor in a county’s bonds is indifferent as to whether the county budget 
is spent on a grandiose fireworks show for the Fourth of July celebrations, 
or on cleaning services provided for local schools; the county’s residents,
however, care a lot about what their taxes are spent on, and might even act 
according to that information when voting. 
Resulting from the difference between the two accounting systems, the 
type of already existing expertise in the private market does not necessarily 
make a positive contribution to establishing a better disclosure regime for 
public entities, nor is the private market better incentivized by unique 
opportunities to leverage expertise in other additional lucrative uses.  
Market participants, and more specifically, public entities, their bond holders, 
and accountants, do not necessarily know better what information is required
by the state administration and general public in order to monitor public
entities’ spending, etc.114  Similarly, market participants themselves—in this
case, public entities and the general public—are not incentivized to further
develop reporting standards.  Although better disclosure regarding budget
use by counties might reduce existing reluctance to pay local taxes, paying 
county taxes, unlike investing in stocks, is not subject to the taxpayer’s discretion;
hence, and although increased transparency might improve collection, on 
its own it would not incentivize increased disclosure—especially when 
other opportunistic reasons exist against such increased transparency.115 
As far as support for privatization as a means to eliminate political influence 
over the content disclosed,116 as mentioned, a public entity’s reports are 
necessary for fiscal planning and monitoring by the local and state government. 
Thus, a political authority, at the level of the local government or beyond, 
113. See FED. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BD., Statement of Federal Financial
Accounting Concepts 1: Objectives of Federal Financial Reporting [hereinafter SFFAC 1], in 
FASAB HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND OTHER PRONOUNCEMENTS, AS 
AMENDED 1, 16 (2016) [hereinafter FASAB HANDBOOK], http://files.fasab.gov/pdffiles/
2016_fasab_handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/3M8Y-RWPT]. 
114. See also Cotton, supra note 111, at 40 (arguing that public scrutiny of the FASAB
process should serve as a much stronger control than the independence of FASAB’s members). 
115. See Akerlof, supra note 104, at 488. 
116. See Hawkins, supra note 107. 
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must be able to adapt the disclosures so as to provide the information
required for its fiscal and monitoring uses.117 
All in all, the institutional approach currently governing accounting 
standard-setting both in the business sector and the public sector—that is, 
the privatization of accounting standard-setting—might118 be justified for
the business sector. However, advantages derived from private sector expertise
and market optimization simply do not apply to disclosure standard-setting 
for public entities. As the following sections show, not only does the 
justification for delegation in the business sector not apply to the public 
sector, but, in fact, while disclosures made in the business sector serve
consensual interests shared by all constituents—that is, to provide information 
useful for investment decision-making—much less uniformity exists in
the case of public entity disclosures.  In the context of public entities, serving 
investor’s needs, in many cases, contradicts the interests of other constituents, 
such as state residents. 
IV. ACCOUNTING DELEGATION AS DELEGATION OF SOVEREIGNTY
Financial statements serve a social need for financial information regarding
business entities such as companies, and public entities such as counties.119 
Meanwhile, as statements become the prominent information source regarding 
economic entities, the power to set the standards regulating disclosure also
confers the power to determine what is known about the entities’ financial 
actions and what is not; what actions are disclosed as income-generating
and therefore are incentivized, and what actions are disclosed as generating 
expenses and are therefore disincentivized.120 Overall, in privatizing accounting
standard-setting for disclosures, there is the risk they are promulgated in 
117. The risk of political manipulation of a statement’s numbers does not exist, as 
the risk exists in a realm where users are distinct from the regulator of the reporting.  Whereas
in the case of public entities, prominent users, like the general public and the government, 
also regulate the reporting standards, through a public accounting standard-setter.
118. See Mundstock, supra note 15, at 814. 
119. Klein, supra note 16, at 604 (explaining the social role reporting fulfills in providing
financial understanding for abstract entities, e.g. companies, conducts).
120. See Allen & Sanders, supra note 55, at 175–76 (examining U.S. practices during 
the 1990s, including how “governments, possessed of a considerable degree of sovereignty,
respond[ed] to discipline imposed by the capital markets and private standard setters”). 
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A. Whoever Controls the Standards, Controls Information 
In order for economic entities to communicate financial information in 
an understandable, efficient, and effective manner, financial reporting
implements consensual patterns of disclosure.123  These patterns use defined 
expressions and phrases determined by accounting standards to communicate
financial results. By following accounting standards, entities can communicate 
information to statement users who may not be fully familiar with every
individual entity’s actions, but are familiar with the standards and their 
financial definitions, and therefore they can digest information disclosed 
by any entity that follows the standards.124 
Two examples of patterns used in accounting-based disclosures are the 
profit and loss report, which summarize the entity’s operational results, and
the balance sheet, which presents its overall financial status.  A fundamental
question in producing these reports is what should be disclosed and
elaborated in the reports and what should be omitted?  Communicating
every tiny detail regarding an entity’s conduct is impractical and highly
inefficient.  Therefore, not all information is presented in the reports. Many
transactions that share common properties are communicated in aggregate 
numbers; for example, all expenses resulting from renovation of all highways
during the reporting period are reported via a single number in the report. 
However, some information regarding highway renovation, for example, 
contracts not as yet executed, are generally not included in the aggregate
numbers nor in any other part of the reports.  That information is generally
determined as not important enough to be included in the limited capacity 
of the report.125
 121. Cf. Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten
Year Perspective, 65 ACCT. REV. 131, 133 (1990); Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, 
Towards a Positive Theory of the Determination of Accounting Standards, 53 ACCT. REV. 
112, 114 (1978) (discussing political influences on standard setting in the private sector).
122. Klein, supra note 16, at 584–85. 
123. Id. at 587. 
124. For example, in business sector reports, financial statements include accounting
parameters that describe investment returns on company shares, representing the company’s
profit for the accounting period divided by the number of outstanding shares: Earnings Per 
Share (EPS).  The EPS parameter provides investors with useful information to evaluate
investments, and is an additional method of evaluation alongside current prices on the stock
market. 
125. Cf. Kenneth W. Bond, GASB 45: What It Means to Local Governments, 39 URB.
LAW. 723, 724 (2007) (analyzing GASB 45, which requires the accrual of some future payment 
even in circumstances where the local government is not obligated to pay). 
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The disclosure standard-setter generally makes the decisions regarding 
what information to disclose and what to leave out of the reports, what to
disclose as a separate item, and what to disclose as part of aggregate numbers. 
When defining the consensual pattern used for disclosures, accounting 
standards define the different items that have to be reported and the form 
to use in reporting the numbers.  For example, for signed contracts not yet 
executed, accounting standards stipulate that although a legal mutual 
contractual obligation exists, its current economic consequences are not
substantive enough and therefore should not be recognized and disclosed
in the reports.126 
Deciding what to disclose and in what form has two far-reaching 
consequences.  First, it affects the ability to control the entity and to monitor
its conduct; second, it affects the entity’s systems and control.  Disclosures 
constitute what we know about the financial conduct of the entity and its 
executive; therefore, the information disclosed and the way it is presented 
directly affects the ability to control and hold the entity and its executives 
accountable. For example, presenting all the county’s administrative expenses 
in a single figure, without providing a separate disclosure of executive
compensation, prevents information regarding the compensation from being
publicly available and therefore shields executives from criticism.
Beyond determining what is known about the entity, accounting standards 
affect systems and control procedures: Fulfilling disclosure requirements 
mandates provision of reliable information that can be confirmed by the 
entity’s external auditor—as generally mandated by federal and state 
legislation.127 Therefore, disclosure actually forces the entity to develop 
systematic procedures to collect the information.  These procedures then 
create control and enhance monitoring both by insiders, such as the entity’s 
comptroller, and outsiders, such as the entity’s auditor. Thus, to a certain
extent, disclosure requirements determine which operations will be monitored 
and systematically managed and which operations will be left unsupervised
—at least at the level of the comptroller and the external auditor. An effective
 126. See, e.g., FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
CONCEPTS NO. 6, ¶ 25 (2008), http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/Document
Page?cid=1218220132831&acceptedDisclaimer=true (“Assets are probable future economic 
benefits obtained or controlled by a particular entity as a result of past transactions or events.”
(footnote omitted)).
127. The Single Audit Act of 1984 requires most governmental recipients of federal 
assistance to have organization-wide financial and compliance audits on an annual basis. 
Pub. L. No. 98-502, 98 Stat. 2327 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 7501 (2012)). 
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way to restrain unwanted expenses in public entities, for example, over­
spending on entertainment such as expensive season basketball tickets by 
a public entity’s executives, is to require a disclosure of these expenses.
System and control procedures created by disclosure requirements should 
not be taken lightly.  In fact, creating system and control procedures was 
the main reason mentioned when Congress decided to insist on the demand
that the Department of Defense invest over $100 million to create a valuation 
system,128  used only for reporting the value of existing—that is, already 
purchased—weapons systems held by the U.S. military, and was not willing 
to be satisfied with reports only on new weapons purchases, which would 
not have required the establishment of such an expensive information
system.129 
B. The Additional Control over Incentives 
Beyond the decision in principle about whether to require information
to be disclosed or not, the decision how to classify the information disclosed
—that is, whether to describe it as generating income for the entity or as 
an expense130—is a decision that determines the effect the disclosure will 
have on the entity’s conduct. 
For accounting disclosure purposes, many of the public entity’s transactions
can be classified either as generating an expense or as generating an asset.131 
For example, payments made by a county’s administration for construction
of a new highway can be expensed fully upon payment and accordingly 
be disclosed as use in-full of the current year’s budget.  In the alternative, 
they be capitalized as an asset and expensed in small amounts during the 
years the road is used and thus disclosed as smaller expenditures of future 
budgets.
Whether to expense or capitalize affects incentives: Entities, and more 
specifically, managers and executives, are measured and evaluated based
on performance as deduced through financial statements.  In the same way
that corporate management that leads a company to report heavy losses
will probably be replaced by shareholders, a mayor that causes a city’s
budget deficit might not be elected for another term. Therefore, executives 
and managers in public companies and political subdivisions alike prefer 
statements to project earnings and increased savings.  And so, the decision 
regarding which transaction and under what circumstances are disclosed
 128. Cotton, supra note 111, at 38. 
129. Id.
 130. See Klein, supra note 16, at 592–93 (discussing the problem of a single set of
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as generating expenses—or liabilities—and which are disclosed as generating 
income—or assets—presents executives with incentives and disincentives.132 
To a certain extent, the decision whether to renovate California State
Route 1 and make congested two-lane segments into a new multiple-lane 
freeway is affected by the way this expensive construction work will be 
presented in California’s financial statements. If the highway’s renovation 
costs are expensed in full the year they occur, then a governor of a deficit 
state would probably be advised by the state comptroller to avoid having 
such a heavy negative effect on the state’s financials; however, if such
expenses are capitalized as an asset, and are only expensed during the
useful life of the road until next expected renovation—that is, five to ten 
years—and cash required for the construction can be raised by loans, for 
which interests payments will also be capitalized with the construction assets, 
then the road will probably be renovated—among other things, increasing
local employment, etc.  All in all, whoever controls information, controls, 
or at least, substantially affects, the conduct.133 
C. The Effect of Voluntary Adoption 
The challenges that emerge with the delegation of sovereign powers are 
further heightened by the fact that state and local governments can choose 
whether to adopt GASB standards or not.134 Remember, state and local 
governments are not obligated to use GASB standards and can use OCBOA. 
Hence, not only can the GASB be incentivized to relax stringent disclosure 
requirements in order to induce adoption, but public entities themselves 
can opt for selective adoption of the standards, creating “opportunistic 
adoption.”  For example, adopting GASB standards only in periods when
the resulting disclosures fulfill current political objectives.  Accordingly,
in troubled times, public entities can opt-out and adopt other standards, 
132. Zeff, supra note 30, at 56 (discussing the “economic consequences”—the incentives
and disincentives—created by financial accounting). 
133. The question of recognition goes beyond the over-simplified debate, whether
an expense should be recognized on an accrual basis—when the liability to pay is generated, 
even if no payment is yet made—or, on a cash basis. The fundamental question is which 
transactions that involve an exchange of an entity’s resources, such as money or manufactured
goods, for other resources, such as services, are considered negative for the entity, and
therefore, as generating an expense; and which are considered positive, and therefore as 
generating an asset or even income. 
134. See Carpenter & Feroz, supra note 75, at 565. 
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including OCBOA.135  Or, local governments can adopt the standards for
only certain and stronger sectors—for example, those expected to result
in favorable disclosures, such as local tax collection departments—and not
for other weaker sectors—in financial terms—for example, fire departments.136 
It should be mentioned that the principle problem with opportunistic adoption 
by states results from the states being a sovereign entity.  Although that 
issue cannot be fully resolved by replacing one dominant set of disclosure 
standards with another set of standards, some improvement can be achieved
by providing incentives for states to commit themselves, even for a pre­
defined period, to a single set of standards.137 
V. THREE STANDARD-SETTERS: TWO DIFFERENT DISCLOSURE 

OBJECTIVES; ONE PENSION CRISIS
 
The question of whether to expense in full or to capitalize, and many
other similar questions concerning the recognition and classification of 
transactions under financial accounting, are fundamental and unavoidable 
for all accounting systems.  If the last fifty years of modern accounting
research has taught us anything, it is that answers to disclosure dilemmas—
whether to expense or to capitalize, to recognize a liability or to obscure the 
information, etc.—are never self-evident, and are conceptually dependent 
on social, normative preferences—that is, they are subjective.138 
At the end of the day, the preferences implemented in the disclosure are
those dictated by the accounting standard-setter who controls disclosure 
specifications.139  Once the power to set accounting standards is delegated 
135. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
136. In contrast to revenue collection departments, like parking departments, which
are characterized by revenue generation and low expenses on labor and equipment, fire
departments are generally characterized by excessive salaries and equipment expenses. 
137. See infra Part VII. 
138. See WILLIAM H. BEAVER, FINANCIAL REPORTING: AN ACCOUNTING REVOLUTION 16
(1981) (“[T]he selection of a financial reporting system is a social choice.”); Joel S. 
Demski, The General Impossibility of Normative Accounting Standards, 48 ACCT. REV. 
718, 718–23 (1973) (proving that accounting cannot be neutral and must be pre-defined 
by an exogenous political objective); see also Peter Miller, Accounting as Social and 
Institutional Practice: An Introduction, in ACCOUNTING AS SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
PRACTICE 1, 13–15 (Anthony G. Hopwood & Peter Miller eds., 1994) (noting that the method
adopted to calculate profits reflects a policy choice by the standard setter) . 
139. The answer to this question, as to many other similar questions regarding transaction 
recognition under accounting, is not self-evident; rather, it is provided, or more accurately, 
dictated, by the accounting standards and according to the objective chosen for financial 
reporting by the accounting standard-setter. Different objectives infer different recognition 
rules. Klein, supra note 16, at 613–14.  If financial statements are designed to allow investors 
better investment decision-making, then a profit will be recognized if it contributes to
future cash inflow to shareholders.  However, if the statements are designed to allow
citizens to monitor the activity of the administrative division, then a profit will be defined 
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and further placed in private hands, the public no longer controls what
information is disclosed by public entities, and in consequence, the extent 
of accountability and internal control created by the disclosure. 
In this respect, a critical decision left to the discretion of the private 
standard-setter is what objectives are disclosures intended to fulfill. 
Disclosures in the business sector classically aim to fulfill the information
needs of those invested in the corporation but who, nevertheless, are not
part of the inner circle—and are therefore dependent on the information 
disclosed.140  In contrast, disclosures in the public sector are seen as also serving 
needs other than those of investors,141 among them, and as discussed above,142 
the need of the local government to fulfill its “duty to be publicly accountable 
for monies raised through taxes” and for their expenditure in accordance
with appropriations laws,143 and the general public “in evaluating the service
efforts, costs, and accomplishments of the [public] entity.”144  Meanwhile, 
it is impossible to provide information in any one report sufficient to meet
all the needs of all users. Moreover, in some cases, fulfilling some users’ 
information needs contradicts with fulfilling the needs of other users.145 
For example, investors ultimately care about future cash inflows, generated 
to serve debt and interest payments on the public entity’s bonds; hence, 
increased investments in non-income-generating infrastructure—for example,
paving new non-toll highways—is seen by them as negative spending as 
it uses resources for purposes not benefitting bond holders.  In contrast,
the public is mainly interested in the services provided by the entity and 
as resulting only from circumstances that contribute to a citizen’s overall quality of life.
Id. at 612. 
140. See, e.g., ELDON S. HENDRIKSEN & MICHAEL F. VAN BREDA, ACCOUNTING THEORY
198–226 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing the role information plays in corporations). 
141. See GASB WHITE PAPER, supra note 112, at 1 (“Governments are fundamentally
different from for-profit business enterprises in several important ways. Their organizational
purposes, processes of generating revenues, stakeholders, budgetary obligations, and propensity
for longevity differ.  These differences require separate accounting and financial reporting
standards in order to provide information to meet the needs of stakeholders to assess government
accountability and to make political, social, and economic decisions.”); SFFAC 1, supra note 
113, at 1–2 (mentioning budgetary integrity, operating performance, stewardship and systems,
and control as the four objectives of federal financial reporting). 
142. See supra Section III.3.
 143. SFFAC 1, supra note 113, at 1.
 144. FED. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BD., Statement of Federal Financial 
Accounting Standards 17: Accounting for Social Insurance, in FASAB HANDBOOK, supra
note 113, at 6.
 145. See Klein, supra note 16, at 587. 
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hence interest payments for bond holders are seen as negative spending. 
In contrast, investments in improving infrastructure—and keeping it toll­
free—are seen as a positive use of funds.  Thus, a profit accounted and disclosed 
under the investors’ perspective is not necessarily a profit under the general 
public’s perspective, and vice-versa.146 
The question of whose objective do disclosures serve—that is, the
perspective used when accounting for and disclosing transactions—affects
information availability and the incentives to which the disclosures give 
rise. If the investor perspective is used, then investors are those who mainly
enjoy the information disclosed by the state, and all other stakeholders— 
the media, state residents, etc.—must invest their own resources in gathering
the information they require.  However, if the general public’s perspective 
is adopted in disclosures then, the public gets the information for free— 
that is, at the state’s expense—and investors are those left to incur the costs 
involved in retrieving the information they need.  The same analysis also
applies with respect to the incentives created by disclosure and accountability— 
the use of the investors’ perspective incentivizes actions that promote investors’
interests while gearing disclosure toward public interest incentivizes promotion
of the public’s interest.
Private standard-setters are aware of the important role the objective of 
reporting plays in disclosure of information and its determinist effect on 
the information provided and interests promoted, and therefore approach 
this question in their conceptual framework—established to include the 
principles applied when standards are developed. 
The FASB, which designates the standards to be used in the business
sector, adopts an exclusive objective based on investors’ needs. The FASB’s
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting explicitly defines its goal: 
The objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial information
about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders, 
and other creditors in making decisions about providing resources to the entity. . . . 
. . . .
Other parties, such as regulators and members of the public other than investors, 
lenders, and other creditors, also may find general purpose financial reports useful. 
However, those reports are not primarily directed to these other groups.147 
In contrast to the FASB’s catering to the investor perspective, the Federal
Advisory Board—known as the FASAB—which sets disclosure standards
 146. Id. at 619. 
147. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
CONCEPTS NO. 8, ¶¶ OB2, OB10 (2010) [hereinafter FASAB ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO.
8] (footnote omitted). 
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for the federal government, adopts a perspective that leans towards the
general public: 
The FASAB and its sponsors believe that any statement of objectives of federal 
financial reporting must be based on the needs of those who use the reports.
Those users include citizens, Congress, federal executives, and federal program
managers. Current and potential users of federal financial information want 
information to help them assess how well the government is doing . . . .148 
Although the federal government raises capital from public investors, as 
a matter of fact, to a much greater extent than any other publicly traded
company including Apple, Amazon, and Google all together—as of September 
30, 2016, the U.S. federal debt held by investors was equal to $14,173
billion149—financials at the federal level are accounted and disclosed using a
non-investor perspective, inter alia, in order to achieve broad public-concern 
objectives, among them to “provide information that helps the reader to
determine . . . whether government operations have contributed to the nation’s
current and future well-being.”150 
What perspective did the GASB adopt?  While the FASB took a
straightforward approach that adheres to the investor perspective over any 
other perspective,151 and the Federal Advisory Board serves the general public
perspective,152 the GASB, perhaps in an effort to please both investors and 
the public,153 both state politicians154 and the federal administration,155 
decided to hold the rope at both ends: “Governmental financial reporting
 148. SFFAC 1, supra note 113, at 5.
 149. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL AUDIT: BUREAU OF THE FISCAL
SERVICE’S FISCAL YEARS 2016 AND 2015 SCHEDULES OF FEDERAL DEBT 1, 17 (2016), https://
www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/feddebt/feddebt_ann2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
WZT3-4FAL].
150. FED. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BD., Statement of Federal Financial 
Accounting Standards 6: Accounting for Property, Plant, and Equipment, in FASABHANDBOOK,
supra note 113, at 9 n.16. 
151. “Other parties, such as regulators and members of the public other than investors,
lenders, and other creditors, also may find general purpose financial reports useful.  However,
those reports are not primarily directed to these other groups.” FASAB ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS 
NO. 8, supra note 147, ¶ OB10. 
152. See FASAB HANDBOOK, supra note 113, at 1. 
153. See Smith, Jr., supra note 67, at 9 (discussing how the need to fulfill contradictory
objectives was approached by the organizations that preceded the GASB).
154. See Carpenter & Feroz, supra note 75, at 588. 
155. See Roybark et al., supra note 66, at 1 (noting that the GASB was established 
under an agreement of parties from the private, public, and federal sectors). 
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should provide information to assist users in (a) assessing accountability 
and (b) making economic, social, and political decisions.”156 
Nonetheless, the GASB is aware of the tradeoff between these two 
different and sometimes contradictory objectives,157 and therefore finds a
creative solution in which the lowest common denominator approach to 
disclosed information is employed: 
Users of state and local governmental financial reports are diverse; their needs 
may be equally diverse.  As a result, it may be impossible to provide information
in any one report sufficient to meet all the needs of all users. Consequently,
the type and amount of information provided in general purpose financial reports
generally should be based on the common needs of users.158 
And, in another place, the GASB acknowledges:
The Board intends to maintain a broad perspective of the meaning and implications
of accountability reporting.  At the same time, it recognizes that information
considered important by some users is not important to others.  Excessive detail
may confuse rather than clarify. Cost-benefit relationships will be carefully considered
by the Board, during its research and due process, when establishing individual 
standards.159 
All in all, while the FASB adopted a business objective suitable for the 
business sector, and the Federal Advisory Board a public objective for the 
federal sector, the GASB adopted a mixed objective that focuses on
providing information based on ambiguous shared interests constrained 
by cost-benefit considerations that sought to serve as many constituents 
as possible. 
Although at the time this extremely broad, two-sided objective was 
adopted, it satisfied all those involved, both from the investor and general 
public standpoints160—and was possibly the only one pragmatically feasible
at the time161—it later turned out to have some devastating consequences. 
156. GASB CONCEPTS STATEMENT NO. 1, supra note 111, ¶ 76. 
157. Klein, supra note 16, at 587. 
158. GASB CONCEPTS STATEMENT NO. 1, supra note 111, ¶ 72. For an elaboration 
on how these objectives are met, see id. ¶¶ 13–17. 
159. Id. ¶ 73. 
160. See Carpenter & Feroz, supra note 75, at 588; Roybark et al., supra note 66, at 
14–17 (describing surveys created by the GASB and indicating that constituents think that 
the GASB performs most of its activities in an outstanding fashion).
161. See Roybark et al., supra note 66, at 10 (describing the controversies and the 
different interest-groups involved in the process preceding the establishment of the GASB).
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VI. THE (NON-)DISCLOSURE OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSION DEFICITS
During the 1990s, it was claimed that the pension disclosures of important
public entities were imprecise162 and therefore confusing and misleading163 
to the majority of users whose objectives GASB standards are designed to 
serve. Consequently, in a standard issued in the mid-1990s, the GASB
repealed these disclosure requirements, thus allowing local governments 
to increase benefits164 without triggering disclosure that could have drawn
public scrutiny and criticism or created control and accountability over 
those benefits.  This left the general public to face potentially disastrous 
consequences that became apparent and fully understood only when these 
once repealed disclosure requirements were reintroduced five years ago.165 
A. GASB Statement No. 25
GASB Statement No. 25,166 issued by the GASB in 1994, reestablished 
financial reporting standards for defined benefit pension plans167 and for
the notes to the financial statements of defined contribution plans of state
and local governmental entities. 
For defined benefit pension plans, GASB Statement No. 25 required 
financial statements to include only a statement of net assets and a statement
 162. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 25: FINANCIAL
REPORTING FOR DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS AND NOTE DISCLOSURES FOR DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PLANS 25 (1994) [hereinafter GASB STATEMENT NO. 25]. 
163.  “Based on the results of a survey and comments received on the ED, the Board 
believes that a standardized measure is not useful to the majority of users, would be confusing 
to them, and might mislead them.” Id. at 23 (explaining why GASB Statement No. 25 is
repealing the requirement to disclose a standardized measure of the pension obligation, which 
is used to assess pension plan status and make comparisons among plans under NCGA
Statement No. 6).
164. See Beermann, supra note 3, at 8. 
165.  The same partially occurred in 2007 when the GASB issued Statement No. 50:
Pension Disclosures—an amendment of GASB Statements No. 25 and No. 27.  See generally
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 50 OF THE GOVERNMENTAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD: PENSION DISCLOSURES (2007) (requiring the disclosure 
of actuarial based pension liability in the notes to financial statements).
166. GASB STATEMENT NO. 25, supra note 162. 
167. In general, a defined benefit pension plan is a plan that “provides retirement 
income and also may provide other types of postemployment benefits, including disability
benefits, death benefits, life insurance, healthcare benefits, and other ancillary benefits.”
Id. ¶ 12. GASB Statement No. 25 specifically excluded postemployment healthcare
benefits from the definition of benefit pension plan because these benefits are specifically
accounted and disclosed according to a separate statement. Id.
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of changes in net assets.168  It did not require a disclosure in the body of
the basic financial statements of any information concerning the net status
of the entity’s pension obligations or changes in these obligations.169 
Although it did require a disclosure of actuarially determined information 
from a long-term perspective, that information focused on the progress being 
made in funding the program170 and not on providing information regarding 
the overall status of the entity’s pension obligation.171  In addition, that
information was only disclosed as supplementary information, presented
after the notes to the financial statements172 and hence beyond the auditor’s
auditing scope, which is generally focused on the body of the statement.
And, above all, an exemption included in the standard could easily bypass 
a requirement for such a disclosure.173 
Crucial to the analysis is the fact that by not requiring a disclosure of 
the net status of the entity’s pension obligations, or changes in these 
obligations,174 GASB Statement No. 25 overturned the prevailing accounting
 168. See ROBERT L. CLARK ET AL., A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1–10 (2003) (describing the evolution of public pensions). 
169. GASB STATEMENT NO. 25, supra note 162, at 24–25. 
170. “The Board has concluded that plan financial statements should provide current
information about the stewardship (custody and management) of the assets held in trust 
for plan members.  The Board does not intend the asset values reported in the financial 
statements to be used for comparisons between assets and a plan’s actuarial accrued
liability (assessments of funded status and funding progress) . . . .” Id. ¶ 79; see also
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., NEW GASB PENSION STATEMENTS TO 
BRING ABOUT MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS IN FINANCIAL REPORTING 1 (2013) [hereinafter NEW 
GASB PENSION STATEMENTS], www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Document_C&pagename 
=GASB%2FDocument_C%2FGASBDocumentPage&cid=1176160140567 [https://perma.cc/ 
FC5T-K8UL] (“While there has been a close relationship between how governments fund 
pensions and how they account for and report information about them until now, the new
guidance [GASB Statement No. 67] establishes a decided shift from the funding-based
approach to an accounting-based approach.”).
171. GASB STATEMENT NO. 25, supra note 162, at i–ii (requiring a statement of plan
net assets, a statement of changes in plan net assets, a schedule of funding progress and a
schedule of employer contributions; however, no statement of the present changes in the 
liabilities of the plan); see also Naughton et al., supra note 17, at 224 (arguing that in contrast
to the FASB’s approach, designed to provide an estimate of the cost of settling the obligation 
to pay pension benefits, the GASB’s approach supports a pension liability calculation that 
is primarily useful in setting a reasonable contribution schedule). 
172. GASB STATEMENT NO. 25, supra note 162, ¶ 18. 
173. Id. ¶ 34 (“When a cost-sharing or agent plan’s financial statements are included
in an employer’s financial report (pension trust fund), the employer is not required to present 
schedules of required supplementary information for that plan if (a) the required schedules
are included with the plan’s financial statements in a publicly available, stand-alone plan 
financial report and (b) the employer includes in its notes to the financial statements information
about how to obtain the stand-alone plan financial report.”). 
174. “Plan liabilities for benefits and refunds should be recognized when due and payable 
in accordance with the terms of the plan.” Id. ¶ 26.  “The difference between total plan 
598
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practice at the time. That practice, which indeed required such disclosures, 
was adopted in 1983 by NCGA Statement No. 6, “Pension Accounting and 
Financial Reporting.”175 
GASB Statement No. 25’s repeal of NCGA Statement No. 6’s disclosure 
requirements and the lack of a requirement for a straightforward disclosure
of the entity’s net pension liability—however, requiring the disclosure of 
net pension assets, if they exist176—were prominent reasons one of the five
board members, Mr. James F. Antonio—the former Missouri State Auditor,177 
holding appointment as the chairman of the GASB board—objected to the
statement;178 the standard was nevertheless adopted, though not unanimously.179 
With respect to the decision not to require disclosure of the entity’s net
pension obligations, the GASB justified its decision “by expressing concern 
about the preciseness of the actuarial estimates and about the accounting
nature of the pension obligation and the unfunded obligation.”180  They 
claimed that these repealed disclosures and other disclosures required by
the superseded NCGA Statement No. 6 were not useful to the majority of 
users and therefore would only be confusing and misleading.181 Remember, 
the lowest common denominator of all users approach for deciding disclosure
was being employed.182 
B. GASB Statement No. 67
Following the 2008 recession, state and municipal defined benefit programs 
received increased public scrutiny,183 as did the accounting treatment of
assets and total plan liabilities at the reporting date should be captioned net assets held in
trust for pension benefits.” Id. ¶ 27. 
175. NAT’L COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING, STATEMENT 6 PENSION 
ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING: PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS AND
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS  ¶ 35 (1983) [hereinafter NCGA STATEMENT
6]. 





GASB STATEMENT NO. 25, supra note 162, ¶ 7.
Smith, Jr., supra note 67, at 10. 
GASB STATEMENT NO. 25, supra note 162, at 24–25. 
Id. at 21. 




See supra text accompanying note 163. 
See GASB CONCEPTS STATEMENT NO. 1, supra note 111, ¶¶ 72–73. 
John W. Mortimer & Linda R. Henderson, Measuring Pension Liabilities
Mitchell, The Future of Public Employee Retirement Systems, in THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 1, 1 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Gary Anderson eds., 2009) 
(discussing other reasons for increased scrutiny of public employee retirement systems). 
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these plans and their associated disclosures.184  Following the re-examination
of pension standards,185 in June 2012, the GASB board unanimously approved
a new accounting and disclosure standard: GASB Statement No. 67, 
Financial Reporting for Pension Plans.186 
Superseding the old 1994 standard—GASB Statement No. 25—the new 
standard introduced a substantive change to the pension disclosure framework: 
It now required defined benefit pension plans to disclose a net pension 
liability equal to the amount of the unfunded portion of the pension, based 
on actuarial estimations.187  In addition, following that change in the disclosure
of program statements, the board also approved another new standard188 
that required state and local governments that participate in defined benefit 
pensions to disclose in their own statements a net pension liability in the 
amount189 of the unfunded portion of the pension.190 
Overall, the standards promulgated in 2012 ended nearly twenty years—
1994–2012—of undisclosed pension deficits.191  The dramatic results of which
 184. See NEW GASB PENSION STATEMENTS, supra note 170, at 1. 
185. Id.
 186. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 67: FINANCIAL
REPORTING FOR PENSION PLANS 24 (2012) [hereinafter GASB STATEMENT NO. 67].
187. “When the total pension liability exceeds the pension plan’s net assets (now 
referred to as plan net position) available for paying benefits, there is a net pension
liability.  Governments will now be required to report that amount as a liability in their 
accrual-based financial statements . . . .” NEW GASB PENSION STATEMENTS, supra note 
170, at 2; see also id. at 52, 78 (explaining the reasons why the new requirements were 
adopted and providing an example of the required disclosure).
188. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 68: ACCOUNTING
AND FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR PENSIONS, at i (2012) [hereinafter GASB STATEMENT NO.
68].  Prior to the issuance of GASB Statement No. 68, factual payments were seen as the
obligating event for state and local governments’ defined benefit financial reporting; in addition, 
net pension liability was relegated to footnote disclosure.  Mortimer & Henderson, supra
note 183, at 424.  Under GASB Statement No. 68, an obligating event occurs in the current
period, as benefits are seen as part of service compensation, and so the unfunded portion of the
pension liability is disclosed in the main statement of the net position. Id.
 189. See Mortimer & Henderson, supra note 183, at 424 (discussing how the standard
under GASB Statement No. 68 implements a statistical model to illustrate the reportable 
net pension liabilities and other accounting parameters). 
190. Id.
191. During these years, programs were required to present partial information regarding
progress in the funding of the program—which, in many instances, was required by law. 
Since 2005–2007, programs were also required to disclose the actuary information underlying
the funding calculations.  See, e.g., Summary of Statement No. 50, GOVERNMENTAL ACCT.
STANDARDS BOARD (May 2007), http://www.gasb.org/cs/Satellite?c=Pronouncement 
_C&cid=1176156701402&pagename=GASB%2FPronouncement_C%2FGASBSummar
yPage [https://perma.cc/TJN6-X5R9].  However, these disclosures allowed flexibility in 
measuring the actuary liability and emphasized disclosure of progress in fulfilling funding 
obligations rather than providing a complete, comprehensive picture of the program’s financial 
status.  GASB Statement No. 67 forced the programs to disclose the overall financial status 
of the program, using strict measuring procedures, while pushing information on funding
600
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are seen these days when more and more local governments recognize the 
need to settle these deficits, to avoid becoming insolvent,192 and, for some 
local governments, to prevent bankruptcy.193 
C. Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards No. 5: 

Accounting for Federal Government Liabilities 

In the year following the GASB repeal of disclosure requirements for 
pension deficits, in 1995, the Federal Advisory Board promulgated standards 
requiring federal agencies whose employees are enrolled in a defined benefits
program, and federal entities that manage those programs, to disclose pension
deficits based on long-term actuarial calculations.194 
Five years after being established to set accounting standards for the 
federal entities,195 in December 1995, the Federal Advisory Board released 
progress to the supplementary part of the reports. See, e.g., Summary of Statement No. 67, 
GOVERNMENTAL ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD (June 2012), http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/
Pronouncement_C/GASBSummaryPage&cid=1176160219444&pf=true [https://perma.cc/
2CXA-M983].
192. See Jack M. Beermann, Resolving the Public Pension Crisis, 41 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 999, 1002 (2014) (provoking a wider discussion of the normative issues surrounding
pension reform by asking if “pension claimants [should] be treated like any other unsecured
creditor . . . or is there a case for treating them as victims of a fiscal disaster beyond their
control”).
193. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of
Financially Failed Cities, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1379 (2014) (discussing “takeover boards,”
which are used by states when less intrusive forms of assistance fail to bring stability to
fiscally distressed municipalities). 
194. See NEW GASB PENSION STATEMENTS, supra note 170, at 2. 
195. History of FASAB, FED. ACCT. STANDARDS ADVISORY BOARD, http://www.fasab.gov/
the-history-of-fasab/ [https://perma.cc/B9B3-KRK8].  “On October 10, 1990, then Secretary of
the Treasury Nicholas Brady, Director of OMB Richard Darman, and Comptroller General
Charles Bowsher jointly agreed to create and sponsor the Federal Accounting Standards 
Advisory Board (FASAB) by signing a ‘Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Among
the General Accounting Office, the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of Management
and Budget on Federal Government Accounting Standards and a Federal Accounting Standards
Advisory Board.’  FASAB would consider and recommend the appropriate accounting 
standards for the federal government.” Id.; see also Memorandum of Understanding between
the Government Accountability Office, the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of 
Management and Budget on Federal Government Accounting Standards and a Federal 




























    
 
   
     
 
      
   
   
     
    
   
  
 
an official Federal Advisory Board standard, “FFAS No. 5,”196 which, 
among other issues, deals with the recognition and disclosure of federal entities’ 
actuarial pension obligations.197  With respect to the administrative entities— 
that is, the entities that administer federal pension plans—FFAS No. 5 requires 
accounting and reporting of pension liabilities to be performed according 
to the present actuarial value of all future benefits based on projected salaries 
and total projected service, less the present actuarial value of future normal
cost contributions that would be made for and by the employees under 
the plan.198 The resulting pension liability must then be reported on the
administrative entity’s financial statements.  In comparison, GASB Statement
No. 25 did not require disclosure of a net pension liability—only a net 
pension asset resulted in disclosure on financial statements, if such exists— 
that is, the program is more than 100 percent funded.199  In a similar fashion, 
actuarial information was only disclosed as supplementary unaudited
information under GASB Statement No. 25.200 
In addition, FFAS No. 5 also requires that the pension liability and all 
other associated expenses for pensions and other retirement benefits— 
including health care—be recognized by the federal employer at the time 
the employee’s services are rendered.201  In comparison, the parallel
contemporaneous GASB standards’ general approach202 required such
prospective costs to be expensed only when actually paid203 or amortized 
over a prolonged period of time.204 Hence, while Federal Advisory Board 
standards introduced full disclosures, GASB standards postponed recognition 
and disclosure on the employer’s statements, and did not require recognition
or disclosure of the actuarial pension liability by the programs.205
 196. FED. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BD., Statement of Federal Financial 
Accounting Standards 5: Accounting for Liabilities of the Federal Government, in FASAB
HANDBOOK, supra note 113. 
197. See id. ¶¶ 62–99.
198. Id. ¶ 71. 
199. See GASB STATEMENT NO. 25, supra note 162, ¶ 7. 
200. Id. ¶ 76. 
201. FED. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BD., Statement of Federal Financial 
Accounting Standards 4: Managerial Cost Accounting Standards and Concepts, in FASAB
HANDBOOK, supra note 113, ¶ 95. 
202. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 27: ACCOUNTING
FOR PENSIONS BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYERS, at ii–iii (1994) [hereinafter 
GASB STATEMENT NO. 27].
203. Mortimer & Henderson, supra note 183, at 424; see GASB STATEMENT NO. 68,
supra note 188, ¶ 90. 
204. See GASB STATEMENT NO. 27, supra note 202, at 21, 24 (discussing the reasons 
for Mr. Antonio’s dissenting opinion). 
205. “Financial statement recognition would not be required for either the plan’s
unfunded actuarial liability according to the actuarial cost method in use or the unfunded
pension benefit obligation (PBO) calculated in accordance with Statement 5.” Id. ¶ 50. 
602
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VII. PREVENTING THE NEXT CRISIS FROM DEVELOPING
Would pension disclosures in the critical years preceding the pension 
crisis have been different if accounting standards for the public sector
were promulgated by an entity other than the private GASB?  Examining 
the disclosure standards promulgated at that time by the public Federal 
Advisory Board suggests an affirmative answer to this question. While
the private GASB repealed the requirement to disclose full actuarial pension 
liabilities, the public Federal Advisory Board launched new standards for 
federal entities that required these very disclosures.
These findings evoke some acute and very disturbing questions.  Was 
the 1994 repeal of the 1983 NCGA Statement No. 6 requirement motivated
by reasons other than the public good?  Was the private standard-setter easing
stringent reporting requirements in order to induce voluntary adoption?206 
As mentioned above, a full historical analysis of the GASB’s motives is 
beyond the scope of this Article; nevertheless, the dramatic consequences 
of undisclosed pension liabilities, taken in the broader perspective of the 
GASB’s declared dual reporting objectives and the board’s need to achieve 
voluntary adoption over OCBOA, suggest some insights.  These insights, 
taken together with the implications privatization of public sector accounting 
standard-setting have on sovereignty, and coupled with the lack of actual
reasoning for such delegation,207 lead to questions concerning the fitness 
of current public sector institutional arrangements of disclosure standard-
setting. 
206. See, e.g., id. at 21, for the reasons provided for Mr. Antonio’s dissenting opinion to
GASB Statement No. 27:
In keeping with the intent of the 1990 ED, Mr. Antonio believes an appropriate 
reaction to the respondents’ comments would have been a slight adjustment of 
the proposed constraints.  Instead, the Board has chosen to remove virtually all 
of those constraints on funding approaches when used for employer pension accounting
measurements. Mr. Antonio is not surprised that a majority of respondents to
this Statement’s ED agreed with the Board’s approach, given the flexibility provided.
207. See discussion supra Part III. 
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A. Moving to Compulsory Standards 
Unsatisfactory functioning of the FASB’s predecessor, the APB,208 caused 
the business and professional community to advocate for its replacement,209 
and similarly, dissatisfaction with NCGA210 resulted in the public sector
community, as  indicated by Congress in 1978 and 1981,211 advocating for
the replacement of the NCGA with a new federal-level public board.
Nonetheless, historical circumstances, including those personally related 
to the sponsor of the Senate initiative,212 caused the institutional arrangement 
already established in the business sector to be duplicated in the public 
sector.
However, as explained in previous sections, public sector disclosures
fulfill user needs that extend beyond financial investments in municipal
bonds. At the same time, financial statements cannot serve all needs213 and 
compromise must be made between the different, and to some extent, 
contradictory, uses. Since 1984, compromises have been drafted by a private
organization—the GASB—which, as part of the efforts to satisfy rival 
information needs, adopted a twofold, almost-impossible objective for public 
entity financial reporting.214  The repeal of critical pension disclosures
stands out as an example of a disclosure compromise implemented in order
to appeal to the lowest common denominator of all users of public entities’
reports.  Non-disclosure enabled public entity executives to offer215 public
 208. See generally Zeff, supra note 39 (discussing the crisis in standard setting that
led up to the appointment of the Wheat Study).
209. Resulting in the establishment of the FASB: In 1971, a public committee,
publicly known as the Wheat Committee, was formed to study the establishment of accounting
principles and to make recommendations for improving the process.  See  AM. INST. OF
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, ESTABLISHING FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS:
REPORT OF THE STUDY ON ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 9 (1972); Richard 
Vangermeersch, Wheat Committee, in THE HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING: AN INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 607, 607–08 (Michael Chatfield & Richard Vangermeersch eds., 1996); 
Zeff, supra note 39. 
210. See Greathouse, supra note 63, at 25. 
211. See Chan, supra note 55, at 5.
212.  Sponsor of the Senate initiative Senator Harrison A. Williams faced a criminal
investigation and eventually had to resign from the House in 1982.  See Joseph F. Sullivan, 
Williams Quits Senate Seat as Vote To Expel Him Nears; Still Asserts He Is Innocent, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 12, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/12/nyregion/williams-quits-senate- 
seat-vote-expel-him-nears-still-asserts-he-innocent-text.html?pagewanted=all. 
213. See supra notes 140 and accompanying text. 
214. See About the GASB, GOVERNMENTAL ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.
gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Page/GASBSectionPage&cid=1176168081485 [https://perma.cc/838G­
XRUF].
215. See Beermann, supra note 3, at 27–31 (explaining how unfunded pension promises
benefit politicians). 
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servants compensation that could not be financed in the long run—without 
triggering public scrutiny or other accountability requirements. 
While similar difficulties with private promulgation of accounting and
reporting standards in the business sector are arguably successfully mitigated216 
—in part, due to the fact that companies are legally required to comply 
with FASB standards—and therefore the FASB is not incentivized to relax 
reporting standards to induce compliance, the GASB faces a much more
complex situation:217  Public entity executives, including elected politicians, 
need reasons to adopt and adhere to GASB standards.218 
Compelling public entities to irrevocably accept the obligation to adhere to
the standards can reduce the need of the standard setter—GASB or others— 
to relax disclosure requirements in order to induce voluntary adoption.  In 
addition, moving to mandatory use would prevent opportunistic adoption 
by public entities.219  Therefore, the first part of improving the public sector’s
disclosure regime is to incentivize state and local governments to commit
themselves to ongoing implementation of a single set of disclosure standards. 
B. What Standards? The Advantages of the Federal Advisory 

Board over the GASB 

Policy reasons for favoring compulsory adoption of Federal Advisory
Board standards over those of the GASB extend beyond the mere factual 
historical success of the Federal Advisory Board in providing adequate pension 
disclosures.  The Federal Advisory Board has systemic advantages that make
it more suited to fulfilling public expectations of public sector disclosures.220
 216. Cf. Mundstock, supra note 15, at 816–23 (criticizing the business sector’s private 
accounting standard setting, following the accounting scandals of the early 2000s, for example, 
Enron and WorldCom). 
217. With respect to funding, § 978(a) of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 grants authority to the SEC to require stock exchanges 
to establish annual accounting support fees to adequately fund the annual budget of the 
GASB.  Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 978, 124 Stat. 1924 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77s (2012)). Accordingly, “[t]he GASB is funded primarily by accounting support fees 
paid by brokers and dealers who trade in municipal bonds.”  What We Do: GASB, FIN.
ACCT. FOUND., www.accountingfoundation.org/jsp/Foundation/Page/FAFSectionPage&cid=
1351027541296 [https://perma.cc/T6DW-PTGV].  However, the same section also includes a
non-interference clause, which states: “Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impair
or limit the authority of a State or local government to establish accounting and financial 
reporting standards.”  15 U.S.C. § 77s. 
218. See Carpenter & Feroz, supra note 75, at 588. 
219. See supra Section IV.3. 
220. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. 
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Among these advantages is the successful integration of non-federal board 
members—who also constitute a majority221—while simultaneously maintaining 
federal oversight due to the ability of the director of Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) or the Comptroller General222 to veto new standards.223 
As a result, the government cannot abuse the process by initiating 
politically-biased standards but can veto standards that are undesirable from
a public good perspective. 
More importantly, the reporting objectives implemented in the Federal 
Advisory Board standards are not ambiguous or twofold.  The Federal Advisory
Board is committed to promulgating standards that serve the general public 
good224 and accordingly sets the standards to require disclosure that first 
and foremost serve the public interest—with an emphasis on control over, 
and accountability of, the public entity.225 
An example that emphasizes the enhanced control and accountability 
implemented by the Federal Advisory Board standards is the fact that 
these standards require entities to recognize the full amount of the liability
and disclose contingent liabilities as soon as their chances of realization 
reach a threshold of 50%—that is, every liability that is more likely than 
not to materialize must be disclosed and accounted for—at 100% of the 
amount.226  This practice currently leads federal entities to disclose liabilities
before state and local governments do.  In contrast, by following the FASB’s 
recognition threshold of likely to occur, GASB standards require recognition 
of contingent liabilities at only an 80% threshold227—that is, only when
the chances of realization are greater than 80%—is an entity employing GASB
standards required to disclose a contingent liability.
The two different approaches to liability recognition stem from the different
DNA of the two standard sets.  GASB standards, as a private market product, 
prefer sub-disclosure that must be preserved in order to prevent disclosure
 221. FED. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BD., FASAB FACTS 2 (2012), http:// 
www.fasab.gov/pdffiles/fasab_facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/W47S-G4B8].  To gain recognition
under the AICPA Rule 203, the ratio of federal officials and non-federal members was 
reversed from 6:3 to 3:6 in 2003.  Professor James L. Chan, American Government Accounting: 
Institutions, Concepts, and Standards, Lecture Series at the University of Cagliari 10 (2008),
http://jameslchan.com/papers/ChanCagSem3.pdf [https://perma.cc/VME6-R3FQ]. 
222. The Comptroller General is the director of the Government Accountability Office.
Office of the Comptroller General, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/
about/workforce/ocg.html [https://perma.cc/B75X-NBTP]. 
223.  FASAB Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 195, § 4. 
224. See SFFAC 1, supra note 113, at 1. 
225.  FASAB Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 195, § 4. 
226. Cotton, supra note 111, at 34–35. 
227. Contingencies: Key Differences Between U.S. GAAP and IFRSs, DELOITTE, http:// 
www.iasplus.com/en-us/standards/ifrs-usgaap/contingencies [https://perma.cc/3GS4-BAXZ]
(elaborating on the difference between U.S. GAAP and IFRSs contingencies recognition). 
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from becoming a “self-fulfilling prophecy” in the market, causing statement
users—for example, debtors—to act prematurely against the entity.228 
Federal Advisory Board standards, in contrast, as a governmental product, 
prefer accountability and over-disclosure of contingent liabilities, even at 
the cost of immature actions from the debtors’ side. 
Getting state and local governments to replace the use of GASB standards 
with those of the FASAB will improve public sector disclosures, accounting 
practice, and accountability. As another example, it will apply required 
changes in the disclosures, those indicated as problematic by existing
research;229 among them, reconciliation of accrual numbers of actual cash 
payments, a prominent disclosure lacking in current reporting practices of
public entities, but implemented according to Federal Advisory Board 
standards.230  Therefore, the second part in improving the public sector
disclosure regime—beyond just incentivizing state and local governments 
to commit themselves to ongoing implementation of a single set of disclosure
standards—is to incentivize state and local governments to use the Federal 
Advisory Board standards instead of those of the GASB. 
C. The Transparency Bill: Good, but with Extensive 

Room for Improvement 

The discussion conducted in the previous sections regarding the accountability
effects of disclosure requirements supports the Transparency Bill,231 as do 
the arguments made with reference to the inadequate disclosure regime
currently established under the existing institutional arrangement used in 
disclosure standard setting for the public sector.232 
228. Over-disclosure of liabilities can cause creditors to act against the entity to
a much greater extent than necessary.
229. See Naughton & Spamann, supra note 3, at 593–97. 
230. Hiroyuki Kohyama & Allison Quick, Accrual Accounting in Federal Budgeting:
Retirement Benefits for Government Workers (Harvard Law Sch. Fed. Budget Policy Seminar, 
Briefing Paper No. 25, 2006), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/Retirement
Benefits_25.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3HT-KYSW] ( “In the Financial Report, the Treasury
includes a table detailing the reconciliation of net operating cost (based on the calculations
in the financial report [accrual based]) and the unified budget deficit (based on the
Presidential/Congressional budget [cash based]).  Most of the differences between the net 
operating cost and the budget deficit are attributable to military employee benefits, civilian 
employee benefits, and veterans’ compensation.”).
231. Public Employee Pension Transparency Act, H.R. 4822, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016).
232. See supra Part IV.3 (discussing opportunistic adoption of disclosure standards 
by states and local governments).
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Nonetheless, as the Transparency Bill focuses on post-employment— 
pension—obligations only, and in solving disclosure malfunction by enacting
specific and elaborate disclosure requirements,233 it does not deal with the
core of the problem and does not affect the systemic arrangements that
allowed such a malfunctioning disclosure regime to exist.  To the contrary, a
move to compulsory use of Federal Advisory Board standards, as suggested
by this Article, will not only solve the current non-disclosure problem but 
will also end the current arrangement that allows states to tailor and shop 
their standards with a private standard setter. 
In this respect, the same means proposed by the Transparency Bill—that 
is, making tax benefits related to bonds issued by a state or political subdivision
conditional upon compliance with disclosure requirements—can be used
to accomplish the suggested institutional change: Incentivize state and
local governments to commit themselves to the Federal Advisory Board
standards in order to maintain bond-related tax incentives. 
At the outset, it can be mentioned that such federal influence on states’
“domestic issues”234 is not extraordinary under the federalism theory235 
and doctrine,236 and rests on sound and substantive legal doctrines.237  A 
famous example of a similar action is the 1984 National Minimum Drinking
Age Act238 in which Congress required239 states to make changes in their 
regulation so as to prohibit persons under 21 years of age from purchasing 
alcoholic beverages, as a condition of receiving state highway funds. 
233. For example, the bill requires the disclosure of the number of participants in every
pension plan, and their exact employment and entitlement-for-benefit status.  “A statement 
of the number of participants who are each of the following—(i) those who are retired or
separated from service and are receiving benefits, (ii) those who are retired or separated 
and are entitled to future benefits, and (iii) those who are active under the plan.”  H.R. 4822
§ 4980J.
234. “[T]he selection of a financial reporting system is a social choice.”  BEAVER, supra
note 138, at 16. 
235. See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL 
IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 69–90 (2008) (reviewing different theories of federalism). 
236. See generally id. at 124–43 (reviewing the judicial doctrine of federalism). 
237. See, e.g., Sarah F. Liebschutz, The National Minimum Drinking-Age Law, 15
PUBLIUS 39, 43 (1985) (evaluating the constitutional basis for federal intergovernmental
regulation in a policy area dominated by states); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation,
Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U.
PITT. L. REV. 607, 613–14 (1985) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 319 (1978)) (discussing how state-imposed regulations, which advance states’ interests at
the expense of national interests, should be addressed). 
238.  23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012). 
239. More accurately, forced: “The Secretary shall withhold 10 per centum of the amount
required to be apportioned to any State [for highway funds] . . . on the first day of each fiscal 
year . . . in which the purchase or public possession in such State of any alcoholic beverage 
by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age is lawful.” Id. § 158(a)(1)(A). 
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All in all, the Transparency Bill clearly indicates a new understanding
that “accounting has become too important to be left to the accountants”240 
even at the state level;241 nonetheless, there is still an acute need to address 
the systemic issue in order to prevent the next financial crisis.
VIII. CONCLUSION
During the last quarter of a century, state and local governments have
taken on the obligation to provide pension benefits to approximately
20,000,000 Americans who are active employees of these entities, and an
additional 7,000,000 retirees and their dependents.242  In recent years, these
public entities have been facing difficulties in financing this obligation.
Enormous amounts of unfunded pension liabilities, estimated to be between
$3,412 billion—Congress’s estimates—and $1,191 billion—the programs’
officially disclosed numbers243—threaten the financial stability of many local
governments. 
This Article argues that today’s pension crisis is only a symptom of the 
systemic weaknesses existing in state and local governments’ disclosure
regimes.  Public entities’ freedom to choose whether or not to adopt disclosure 
standards promulgated by a private organization, combined with the resulting 
need of the private promulgator to promote their own standards by relaxing
stringent disclosure requirements, add up to an inadequate disclosure regime. 
The Transparency Bill, introducing specific disclosure requirements with 
respect to post-employment liabilities of state and local governments, is 
one welcome step towards improving public sector disclosures.  Nonetheless, 
it only deals with one symptom—that is, the current specific lack of adequate
disclosures regarding pension liabilities—and does not address the institutional 
source of the problem.  This Article, in contrast, suggests incentivizing state
and local governments to improve their disclosure conduct entirely—that 
is, to replace voluntary adoption of privately promulgated GASB disclosure
standards with compulsory use of disclosure standards promulgated by the
Federal Advisory Board.
The transformation from voluntary adoption of privately promulgated
standards, which implement inadequate reporting objectives not focused
 240. JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR
NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 94 (1975). 
241.  At the national level, see Jones & Smith, supra note 31, at 244. 
242. Public Employee Pension Transparency Act, H.R. 4822, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016).
243. Id.
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on control and accountability, to compulsory use of federal-based standards,
which are more conservative and emphasize control and accountability, is 
expected to contribute to minimizing the chances for the next public sector
financial crisis to develop due to inadequate disclosure.
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